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The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line- W.E.B. Du 
Bois (1903) 
This chapter contains previously published coauthored material. A version of the 
paragraphs on the displacement paradox and the green paradox on pages 11-13 appear in 
an article which has been previously published in Energy Research and Social Science 
with Dr. Richard York and Dr. Julius Alexander McGee (Greiner, York, and McGee 
2018). 
 
Though it is, perhaps, the most well-known phrase written by W.E.B Du Bois, it 
is scarcely known that the above epigraph was penned by Du Bois more than once. While 
the phrase appeared in both the forethought and the second chapter of The Souls of Black 
Folks (Du Bois 2003), it was only in the second chapter, “Of The Dawn of Freedom”, 
that the full meaning of the phrase was laid bare. “The problem of the twentieth century 
is the problem of the color-line –the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in 
Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea” (Du Bois 2003 p. 16). The often-
ignored version of the famous quote belies an important truth. The color-line was deeply 
tied to matters of international inequality and colonial exploitation. It was as a result of 
this truth that, in much of his thought and work, Du Bois emphasized the critical role of 
colonial and imperial relations in the establishment of the international capitalist empires 
of Twentieth century Europe (Du Bois 1920; Morris 2015; Morris 2017). Thus, it should 
be noted that when Du Bois discusses the color-line as “the problem of the twentieth 
century”, it is not simply in reference to the internal race relations of the United States or 
any other nation. Rather, it is in reference to a complex of relations of international 
inequality which find their roots in colonization and the establishment of an international 
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hierarchy of nation-states which, to a large degree, remains in place today. Indeed, Du 
Bois reminds us that, not just race, but also the ongoing legacies of colonization, 
imperialism, and international exploitation that were predicated upon it were established 
because: 
“It pays. Rubber, ivory and palm-oil; tea, coffee, and cocoa; 
bananas, oranges, and other fruit; cotton gold and copper –they, 
and a hundred other things which dark and sweating bodies hand 
up to the white world from their pits of slime, pay and pay well, 
but of all that the world gets the black world get only the pittance 
that the white world throws it disdainfully… Colonies, we call 
them, these places where “niggers” are cheap and the earth is 
rich…They belt the earth these places, but they cluster in the 
tropics, with its darkened peoples: in Hong Kong and Anam, in 
Borneo and Rhodesia, in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, in Panama and 
Havana –these are the El Dorados toward which the world powers 
stretch itching palms” (Du Bois 1920, pp.22-23). 
 
In the Twenty-First century the problem of the color line and international 
inequality has not subsided, despite popular notions to the contrary. In fact, the 
recognition of another key problem in the Twenty-First century, environmental 
degradation, has only exacerbated these issues and highlighted the urgent need to 
understand how it is that international inequality and the ever-quickening pace at which 
the environment is being destroyed are linked together. Interrogating these links raises 
important questions, the answers to which, in many ways, offer a challenge to 
conventional understandings of both moral and technological progress that is thought to 
accompany development of the international economy. Questions such as: what is the 
relationship between economic development and environmental impact? Has this 
relationship been improving over time, as we all hoped it would? How does inequality 
play into this relationship? How can we best understand inequality between nations? 
What is the relationship between colonization and environmental impact? And is it 
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possible for us to foster economic growth in all nations while also reducing the impact 
that humans have on the environment? 
The essays that follow provide a sociological meditation on such questions. 
Throughout the course of this meditation I argue that, contrary to popular beliefs about 
environmental sustainability, global economic development –as it is currently conceived 
–is incompatible with the mitigation of environmental impacts, even when technological 
advances are considered, and even as awareness of the problem of environmental change 
spreads. Further, I argue that this incompatibility is ineradicably rooted in historical 
relations of international inequality. Relations which in many ways trace their origins to 
colonial and imperial patterns of domination. In order to demonstrate this, I empirically 
explore the relationship between economic development, political and technological 
change, and environmental impacts in nations occupying various positions of power in 
the international economic system. Prior to presenting these analyses, however, I believe 
it would be of use to provide a brief description of the connections between 
environmental protections, inequality, and economic development. To begin, I turn to a 
discussion of the sustainable development concept. 
The Sustainable Development Concept 
 
Broadly speaking, concerns with environmental mitigation and understandings of 
sustainability have been deeply tied to issues of equality, at least tangentially. For 
example, the first and most commonly employed definition of sustainable development 
was established at the World Commission on Environment and Development, which has 
come to be known as the Brundtland Commission (UN 1987). The document created 
during the commission, Our Common Future, or The Brundtland Report (UN 1987), 
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identified sustainable development, quite simply, as “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs”. In this definition, equality appears as the operating principle, where no given 
generation’s needs are favored over any others, with development being mentioned only 
insofar as it is considered the means by which those means are met.  
The broad outline for sustainable development laid forth in the Brundtland Report 
was given greater structure during the United Nations Conference on the Environment, or 
the Rio Earth Summit. In the resulting document (UN 1992) it was stated that 
governments should promote sustainable development policies at the national and 
international level that aim: 
 
“a. To promote an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multi-
lateral trading system that will enable all countries – in particular, 
the developing countries – to improve their economic structures 
and improve the standard of living of their populations through 
sustained economic development; 
 
b. To improve access to markets for exports of developing 
countries; 
 
c. To improve the functioning of commodity markets and achieve 
sound compatible and consistent commodity policies at national 
and international levels with a view to optimizing the contribution 
of the commodity sector to sustainable development, taking into 
account environmental considerations; 
 
d. To promote and support policies, domestic and international, 
that make economic growth and environmental protection mutually 
supportive” (UN 1992, p 5.)  
 
Examination of these objectives reveals three primary priorities. Those of reducing 
inequality (and in particular economic inequality) between nations, the creation of an 
open international system of trade that promotes economic development on a global 
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scale, and the protection of the environment. These three priorities, which together 
compose what I refer to as the sustainable development concept, are rarely in harmony, 
and when examined critically reveal tensions that are inherent to the project of 
sustainable development itself. For example, in contrast to the suggestion that economic 
growth and the liberalization of trade can be a tool for reducing inequality, previous 
research has shown that economic growth, globalization, and trade liberalization lead to 
increases in inequality by reducing the cost of wage labor for capital (Harrison 2002; 
Kristal 2010; Piketty and Saez 2014). Further, it has been well established that reductions 
in wages, as well as the orientation of economies toward exports, is associated with the 
establishment of unequal exchange between nations (Emmanuel 1972a; Amin 1974). 
Specifically, trade liberalization and the establishment of export economies prevents the 
establishment of viable internal economic development within poorer nations (Emmanuel 
1972a) and places deflationary pressures upon wages and currencies (SAPRIN 2004), 
putting nations that take such actions on a path of ‘underdevelopment’ (Frank 1967) 
relative to their wealthier counterparts in the global North.  
In practice, even in the simpler understanding of sustainable development (UN 
1987), the phrase “development that meets the needs of the present” is often interpreted 
by policy makers and neoclassical economists as development which does not impede or 
slow the accumulation of capital. As a result, understandings of international 
environmental sustainability are focused on amalgamating the mitigation of global 
environmental change and spurring the pace economic development.  Such a view of 
sustainable development has led many approaches to intervening in anthropogenic 
climate change, such as emissions stabilization to the levels of the year 1990, to be 
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dismissed as being too costly in terms of economic growth (Nordhaus 1992).  Despite the 
privileged position that economic development occupies in sustainable development 
discourse, increasing, or even maintaining, the present pace of economic development is 
widely recognized as being at odds with mitigating environmental harm (York et. al 
2003a; Jorgenson and Clark 2012), as economic activity is known to be one of the 
primary drivers of carbon dioxide emissions (IPCC 2014). In order to understand why it 
is that economic activity tends to be a driver of environmental devastation, it is worth 
turning to the treadmill of production theory.  
Treadmill of Production theory was introduced in order to account for the massive 
environmental degradation that followed the end of World War II (Gould, Pellow, & 
Schnaiberg, 2004). Drawing from Marxian theories concerning economic accumulation, 
Schnaiberg (1980) argued that as more capital was made available to be invested into 
newer and more efficient technologies, production processes would become more and 
more reliant on these technologies, eventually using them to replace significant portions 
of the workforce. The replacement of human labor with new technologies would have 
two effects. First, as new technologies penetrated deeper into the production processes of 
society, expanded extraction of natural resources would be required in order to provide 
these new machines with the materials they require to operate properly. The second effect 
of the growth in capital’s application of the new technologies would be that political 
elites, under pressure from industry to support expansion, and from workers to provide a 
growing job market, would enact policies that would enable businesses to easily expand 
into new markets and sectors. This expansion, in turn, would grow consumption levels, as 
the employment rate stayed relatively stable, and the market for new technologies 
 7 
steadily increased. The end result would be a cycle, or ‘treadmill’, that required ever-
greater quantities of ecological resources, and produced ever-greater quantities of 
pollutants (Gould et al., 2004; Schnaiberg, 1980; Schnaiberg & Gould, 2000).  
Understanding these relations, particularly with respect to withdrawals and 
additions, sheds light onto the difficulty of reducing environmental impact globally, as 
well as how it is that much of international pollution occurs in the global South. All 
social production processes rely on varying amounts of inputs that must be derived from 
the surrounding ecosystem in order to be carried out. Such production processes also 
require that environmental inputs be transformed in some way through various physical 
or chemical procedures. Once the transformation of inputs has been achieved, waste from 
all aspects of the production process must be done away with.  Despite the physical 
requirement of environmental additions and withdrawals in the production process that 
have been noted by neo-Marxian theorists, in the late Twentieth century several 
environmental economists noted that the observed relationship between national level 
income and a variety of atmospheric pollutants was weakened as income levels rose 
(Grossman and Krueger 1995; Panayatou 1997). Extrapolating from these observations, 
many began to argue that increasing national wealth was accompanied by investments in 
more ecologically efficient technologies (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1992), and the 
implementation of political policies that were aimed at protecting environmental 
resources. The crux of this argument, which would come to be called the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve hypothesis, was that as wealth was developed populations could “afford” 
to be concerned with protecting the environment. Put differently, a safe and healthy 
environment should be considered a luxury item (York et al. 2003a).  
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It should be noted that the belief in a dematerialized economy, where growth can 
take place without impacting the environment, (Mol 2000) largely ignores that all 
material goods require environmental additions and withdrawals, as well as the global 
nature of economic activity. Indeed, proceeding in theoretical and empirical analyses as 
though every nation’s environmental resource and sink use is contained within its 
borders, known as the Netherlands fallacy (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971a), disregards the 
international division of labor (Fröbel, Heinrichs, & Kreye 1981) and the fact that 
legacies of colonization and economic underdevelopment have rendered poorer nations 
more likely to be the sight of resource extraction (Bunker 1984) and environmentally 
intensive/inefficient production (Jorgenson 2003; Roberts, Grimes, & Manale 2003). 
Thus it is that, while economic development might lead to a “decoupling” of 
environmental impact and economic activity in the global North, it typically tightens the 
coupling of these factors in the global South, increasing both international inequity and 
environmental impact in one fell swoop. 
Resolution Through Technology 
Recognition of the inherent tensions between economic development and 
environmental protection, and economic development and international equity, that rest at 
the heart of the sustainable development concept has led green technology to be widely 
viewed as a mechanism through which capital accumulation can continue unabated, while 
allowing environmental sinks and resources to be conserved indefinitely (Lomborg 
2012). For example, the most recent report of the United Nations Environment Program 
begins by arguing that while in the past “tackling pollution was equated to imposing costs 
on industry and economic growth…global trends are demonstrating this is no longer the 
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case… investing in green technologies is a strategy for long term profitability and 
prosperity for all” (UNEP 2017, p. 1). Such a contention implies that the environmental 
crisis is, at root, a technical issue, one which is devoid of social or historical relevance 
and the attendant issues of power and inequality that accompanies it. 
That technology should not be viewed as an asocial deity through which the crises 
of international inequality, a la the color-line, and environmental devastation, a la global 
climate change, can be resolved independently of social discretion is perhaps best 
expressed by Mészáros: 
“To say that ‘science and technology can solve all our 
problems in the long run’ is much worse than believing in 
witchcraft; for it tendentiously ignores the devastating social 
embeddedness of present day science and technology. In this 
respect, too, the issue is not whether we use science and 
technology for solving our problems –for obviously we must– but 
whether we succeed in radically changing their direction, which is 
at present narrowly determined and circumscribed by the self-
perpetuating needs of profit maximization” (Mészáros 2015, p. 
29). 
 
Understanding how it is that science and technology are circumscribed by the social, 
economic and political dictates of the accumulation of capital is critical to grasping why 
it is that the problems of international inequality and environmental change are not, 
solely– or even primarily– technical problems. 
There are, broadly speaking, two reasons that technology is unlikely to increase 
the ecological impact of social and economic processes and, thereby, reduce the rate or 
scale of anthropogenic climate change. As suggested by Mészáros (2015), both reasons 
are tied to the role of technology as a tool of accumulation in the socio-metabolic 
formation of capital. The first of these reasons has to do with the adoption of new 
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technologies in the production process, while the second concerns the use of new 
technologies once they have been adopted. 
 Commonly, it is assumed that new technologies will be adopted by firms in order 
to increase the efficiency of their operation, thereby allowing them to increase the rate of 
production and, in doing so, both reduce the variable component of capital (e.g. the cost 
of wage labor) while maintaining or growing the rate at which each commodity unit is 
produced. According to this logic, by taking such action firms are given a marketplace 
advantage, one which other firms seek to emulate. Those who are successful in this 
emulation proceed to reformulate the composition of the constant (e.g. fixed) component 
of their capital investments, while those who are not successful are absorbed. This is what 
Schumpeter (1950) terms the “creative destruction” of capitalism. Critically, this view of 
capitalism ignores the increasingly centralized nature of capital in the contemporary 
economy. Put differently, this ignores that over the course of the twentieth century giant 
firms, rather than small business and corporations, became the primary economic actors 
both nationally and internationally (Baran and Sweezy 1966). In this new form of 
monopoly capital– and to an even greater degree in the subsequent stage of monopoly 
finance (Foster 2010), or abstract (Amin 2013), capital– “innovations are typically 
introduced (or soon taken over) by giant corporations which act not under competitive 
pressure but with careful calculations of the profit maximizing course” (Baran and 
Sweezy 1966, p. 93). As a result of this shift in competitive logic, new innovations in 
methods of production will only be introduced in particular circumstances. Those 
circumstances being that the new mode of production provides large enough gains in 
efficiency that the losses of abandoning the capital invested into the previous mode of 
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production are entirely recovered, or that there is an opportunity for market expansion 
and new productive facilities are required at any rate. In either case, firms will not adopt 
new technologies simply for their benefit to the environment or because other firms have 
done so (Baran and Sweezy 1966). 
 In the instance that new technologies are adopted in order to expand markets, 
another barrier to the use of such technologies for reductions in ecological impacts is 
imposed. Specifically, the use of technologies in order to expand the reach of a firm into 
new consumer markets does not result in the displacement of previously existing, less 
environmentally efficient technologies, but rather adds the impacts of the new technology 
to those of the older ones. This phenomenon, which has been termed the displacement 
paradox (York 2012; McGee 2015; McGee 2017), focuses on the power of corporations 
in market economies to drive growth so as to increase profits (York 2016; York 2017; 
York and McGee 2016). Displacement paradox theory highlights that companies 
typically will work to 1) ensure that their products have markets, and to 2) expand 
consumption of all such products within those markets (McGee 2015). As a result, we 
should not necessarily expect a new technology, resource, or product, to simply replace 
another one, because in most arenas of economic enterprise the goal of the typical firm is 
to produce more products and increase the frequency with which all its products are 
consumed (York and McGee 2016; York 2017). With respect to “green” technologies, 
this dynamic often has the consequence of preventing resources and technologies that are 
less environmentally harmful from replacing those that are more so. If, as it is often 
implicitly assumed is the case, demand for products was more or less constant, then 
producing commodities using new technologies would inevitably lead to a reduction in 
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both the use of older technologies and the consumption of resources. However, the 
realities of sunk costs and geographic limitations can prevent new technologies and more 
efficient resources from replacing those that are extracted and distributed through well-
developed infrastructures, and in some instances can even spur the use of established 
resources and technologies (Sinn 2009). 
In addition to theory on the displacement paradox, another complimentary socio-
ecological approach, the green paradox (Sinn 2012), presents reasons why supply-side 
forces generate demand. The green paradox and displacement paradox together highlight 
how broader political and economic context may influence the extent to which one 
resource is able (or not) to effectively displace another. The displacement paradox 
emphasizes that new products, technologies, and resources often serve to expand 
consumer markets, rather than replacing resources previously used in such markets. 
Complimenting this view, the green paradox offers insight into how regulation and 
market mechanisms intended to curb the use of a particular resource might 
unintentionally lead to an intensification of its use. The green paradox theorization starts 
with the observation that businesses typically seek to avoid regulations and work to 
prevent loss of profits from the devaluation of their own capital assets, such as control of 
fossil fuel reserves. Resource-owning firms anticipate the introduction of regulations that 
may reduce the value of their assets – such as new environmental laws that could increase 
the costs of extracting, and/or lower the profit margins for selling, fossil fuels. For 
instance, policy implementation and government subsidization aimed at encouraging the 
production of wind power are likely to have the intended effect of driving down the 
market price of wind power, but this will also suppress the price of other energy sources 
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in a competitive market. This brings about the unintended consequence of motivating 
firms to anticipate future government actions in order to extract and sell as much of the 
capital invested in old technologies and established resources as quickly as possible, 
before new regulations or subsidies are implemented that drive down prices or prevent 
the firms from accessing or selling such resources. Thus, the paradox is that the 
anticipation of new environmental laws aimed at suppressing the use of fossil fuels, or at 
reducing the use of less efficient technologies, drives growth in the rate of their use (Sinn 
2009; 2012). The green paradox fits with the displacement paradox in that it shows how 
supply-side logics drive production and can prevent new technologies and resources from 
suppressing the use of established ones1. 
Finally, it is important to note that even if more efficient resources or technologies 
are able to replace previously existing ones, there is yet another barrier to this 
replacement resulting in the reduction of environmental impact. The Jevon’s paradox is 
the term used to describe occasions where increases in the efficiency with which 
resources used in the processes of production are associated with increases in the overall 
levels of consumption of that resource (Foster, Clark, and York 2010; York and McGee 
2015). York and McGee (2015) cite two primary reasons that this pattern is regularly 
observed. First, it is possible that reductions in the cost of commodity production 
associated with more efficient resource use leads to increasing consumption. That is, as a 
product becomes cheaper it is more likely to be consumed. Second, it could be the case 
that the supply and demand side savings from the improvements in efficiency spur 
                                                 
1 A version of the paragraphs on the displacement paradox and the green paradox appear in an which has 
been previously published in Energy Research and Social Science with Dr. Richard York and Dr. Julius 
Alexander McGee. 
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spending elsewhere, and thereby lead to an increase in the total consumption of the 
resource. 
 In a fashion similar to the claim that technological innovation can, on its own, 
lead to a reduction of environmental impacts, the proposition that technology can be 
relied upon to reduce national or international level inequality ignores the role that 
technologies often play in processes of accumulation. As a result of its critical role in 
processes of war, finance, and production, technology serves as a means of domination in 
the global economic system (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Pomerantz 2000; Amin 2013). 
Interestingly, while within the formation of capital environmental resources and sinks are 
often seen as free gifts, technologies are not. For example, even in the course of the 
transition from the feudal system of social relations to those of capital the control of 
technological resources was critical to maintaining conditions favorable to accumulation. 
For this reason, accounts of English landlords smashing, burning, and otherwise 
destroying the hand-mills of the peasant and laboring populations in order to force the use 
of the landlord’s centralized mill in processes of production can be found from the 
Twelfth to the Sixteenth century (Merchant 1990). The control of technology has only 
intensified with the passage of time, with governments using violence and political 
apparatus to ensure that the ownership of technology by firms in the global North is not 
infringed upon in the course of global production processes (Pomerantz 2000; Screpanti 
2014) 
As a result of the strict control of the flow of technological goods in the global 
economy, multinational corporations within the wealthy nations of the global north often 
rely upon a combination of intellectual property rights and trade liberalization in order to 
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retain control over the global distribution of technologies (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).  
The results of this are twofold. Technologies employed in the global South increase the 
average labor productivity of the production process, thereby minimizing the cost of 
wages to firms operating within those nations, even as they raise the typical rate of 
investment in fixed capital (Pomerantz 2000). In the global North the control of 
technological resources grants firms an exchange advantage in the international 
marketplace that enables the transfer of wealth from labor in the South to capital in the 
North (Screpanti 2014), while also exerting a deflationary pressure on the wages of 
laborers in the North by reducing the cost of goods and, thereby, the cost of living 
(Foster, McChesney, and Jonna 2011). 
Primitive Accumulation, Exploitation, And the Necessity of Inequality in Capital 
Quite apart from the limitations of technologies employed within the circuits of 
capital to bolster global equity, there is another reason that international inequality is 
unlikely to be alleviated under the sustainable development paradigm. In the most 
straight forward sense, the elimination of international inequality is at odds with the 
accumulation of capital, and, thus, circumscribed by the pursuit of economic growth. This 
insight is at least as old as Marx’s (1976) critique of political economy itself. According 
to this critique, the establishment of inequality is a necessary precursor to the 
accumulation of surplus value through the exploitation of wage labor. Specifically, before 
capital can draw surplus from a labor force it must create a labor force. This requires of 
course that a population be separated from the means of subsistence it had traditionally 
relied upon. This ‘primary’, or ‘primitive’ moment in the establishment of the social 
relations that constitute capital “operates two transformations, whereby the social means 
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of subsistence are turned into capital, and the immediate producers are turned into wage-
labourers. So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production” (Marx, 1867, pp. 874-
875). As the general process of accumulation requires that surplus be exploited from the 
wage laborer in the course of the working day, the establishment of a situation wherein 
some minority of the population maintains control over the resources necessary to the 
processes of production at the expense of the majority (i.e. the inequitable distribution of 
resources) is fundamental to the proper function of the system as a whole. 
Though it is often viewed as a precondition for the realization of capital, the 
expansion of capital necessitates the growth of the laboring population which is available 
to it in order to allow for the continuation of accumulation and economic growth. As a 
result, the processes of accumulation, and the expropriation of labor must be international 
in scope. 
Capitalism in its full maturity also depends in all respects 
on non-capitalist strata and social organizations existing 
side by side with it…capital needs the means of production 
and the labour power of the whole globe for untrammeled 
accumulation; it cannot manage without the natural 
resources and labour power of all territories. (Luxemburg, 
2004, pp. 345-346)  
 
This insight raises an important question. How is it that the expropriation of labor and the 
accumulation of resources, and subsequently capital, in territories beyond the borders of 
an economy’s origin takes place? Du Bois provides us with the answer to this question in 
the form of the color-line, colonialism, and the establishment of a hierarchical world 
system. 
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As evidenced above, Du Bois was well aware of the necessity of expropriation of 
both labor and natural resources to the survival of the social formation of capital. Failure 
to provide an opportunity for such expropriation has the potential to create a situation 
wherein “the requirements of accumulating capital… exceed the growth in labor-power 
or in the number of workers,” and, as a result, labor gains an advantage relative to capital 
that can be mobilized in order to increase wages and improve conditions (Marx, 1867, p. 
763). The exhaustion of available resources and, in particular, the lack of a suitable 
reserve army of labor, which “during periods of stagnation and average prosperity weighs 
down the active army of workers; [and] during the periods of overproduction and feverish 
activity… puts a curb on their pretensions” (Marx, 1867, p. 792), in much of Europe thus 
led to the establishment of various social services and the beginnings of a reduction in 
inequality. It was for this reason Du Bois exclaimed that the: 
“Breath of life, thought to be so indispensable to a great 
European nation… is expansion overseas; it is colonial 
aggrandizement which explains, and alone adequately explains, the 
[first] World War. How many of us today fully realize the current 
theory of colonial expansion, of the relation of Europe which is 
white, to the world which is black brown and yellow? Bluntly put, 
the theory is this: It is the duty of white Europe to divide up the 
darker world and administer it for Europe’s good. This Europe has 
largely done” (Du Bois 1920, p. 20-21). 
 
Du Bois made the importance of the expropriation of laborers of color around the globe 
to the success of capital abundantly clear in his analysis of the reconstruction era 
following the Civil War in the United States. In particular, he argued that the 
establishment of the racialized hierarchy that shouldered the development of one of the 
most dominant capitalist economies in the modern world system was not a tragic 
occurrence unique to that nation, but rather represented a microcosm of the conditions 
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under which the capitalist world system was able to develop, expand, and thrive (Du Bois 
2007). In other words, it is the expropriation of not just environmental resources, but also 
of physical labor power, that is necessary of the ongoing expansion of the accumulation 
complex (Robinson 2000). 
 Building upon Du Bois’ recognition of the importance of the color-line and 
international inequality to the ongoing expropriation of resources and labor, and, thus, the 
accumulation of capital, more recent work has demonstrated that the modus operandi of 
capitalism has always been to magnify cultural and physical difference in order to create 
racialized others. Thus, it was the Slavs who become the first slave caste under 
capitalism, and the Irish who became the first colonized population (Robinson 2000). 
This racialization was not only fundamental to the establishment of capitalist 
accumulation (Du Bois 2017; Dawson 2016; Fraser 2016), but has served as the 
mechanism through which historical and ongoing forms of expropriation were established 
and justified, including “territorial conquest, land annexation, enslavement, coerced 
labor, child labor, child abduction, rape… prison labor, transnational sex trafficking, 
corporate land grabs, foreclosures on predatory debt… and… contemporary imperialism” 
(Fraser 2016, p. 167). In this way, racialized expropriation still plays an important role in 
the accumulation of capital, particularly with regards to the ongoing imperialism that is 
constituted through relations of unequal exchange that rest on the historical foundations 
of colonial empires, as well as the implementation of financial exploitation through the 
accumulation of odius debt and the application of structural adjustment policies (Stiglitz 
2007; Amin 2013; Screpanti 2014). Considering the origins of accumulation in inequality 
and racialization, it seems dubious, to say the least, that a sustainable development which 
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prioritizes the continuation of economic growth can also accommodate the reduction of 
inequality in the international economy. 
 In light of the literature discussed above, in the subsequent chapters I will perform 
a series of analyses in order to demonstrate the importance of understanding and 
addressing international inequality in order to move the global economy in a more 
sustainable direction. In chapter 2 I interrogate the contention that the development of 
ecological rationality can lead to a global reduction in environmental impact. In order to 
do so I examine the relationship between theoretically relevant factors captured by the 
passage of time, such as technological change, the implementation of political regimes 
aware of the environmental crisis, and the increased social awareness of– and concern 
with– global climate change. I condition the relationship between such factors and carbon 
dioxide emissions on the position that a nation holds in the world system to capture the 
effect that geopolitical inequality has on these relationships. In chapter 3 I compliment 
the analysis performed in chapter 2 by considering the effect of international power 
relations, in terms of a country’s placement in the world system, on individual nation’s 
ability to use wealth to mitigate negative environmental impacts. Further, I argue that 
understanding historical inequalities between nations is critical to furthering our 
knowledge of the social and economic drivers that underlie climate change. In 
performing this analysis, I explore the argument that global economic development can 
provide a route to sustainable socio-economic relations, regardless of consideration of 
historical international inequality. A version of chapter 3 has been previously published 
in the journal Socius with my coauthor, Julius Alexander McGee (Greiner and McGee 
2018. My Co-author helped to frame the argument, helped to develop the modeling 
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approach, and wrote the section on the Environmental Kuznets Curve, as well as parts of 
the conclusion. In chapter 4 I build on this argument further by exploring these 
relationships in the context of the historical legacies of colonization. In doing so I am 
able to indirectly take into account, not just inequality, but also the racialized nature of 
international exploitation in capital. Further, in combination with the analysis in chapter 
3, chapter 4 facilitates a discussion of how we should best understand international 





ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT- 
HAS TIME REDUCED OUR IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT? 
 
It is often taken for granted by national governments and international 
organizations that, over time, there is a linear progression in both technological efficiency 
and ecological awareness among populations, producers, and policy makers that leads to 
a general decline in negative anthropogenic environmental impact (IPPC, 2014; UNEP, 
2012). In many ways, the environmental social sciences have been developed through the 
findings, debates, and contentions that surround the relationship between year to year 
changes in social, economic and political factors, and such impacts– and are meant to 
examine whether such trends do indeed exist. The nuances of the relationship between 
carbon dioxide emissions and a host of other social indicators, such as economic growth, 
population structures, and technological change have been the motivating force behind 
many theoretical and methodological innovations, though such developments have often 
taken place with the aim of refuting or qualifying the validity of preceding contributions 
to method or theory. For example, in the field of structural human ecology (SHE) York, 
Rosa and Dietz (2003a) employed cross-national STIRPAT analyses to demonstrate the 
presence of a significant and positive association between economic growth and increases 
in a nation’s environmental footprint. Such findings were built upon and complicated by 
Liddle (2014) whose work demonstrated the importance of accounting for the 
demographic age structure of populations in such studies. These contributions continue to 
be built upon further still, as is well exemplified by recent work that incorporated spatial 
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regression analysis into the traditional STIRPAT formulation in order to illustrate the 
need to conceptualize the effect of urbanization as a phenomenon that brings about 
environmental impact in both technological (e.g. spatial) and demographic capacities 
(McGee, Clement & Besek, 2015). 
  Interestingly, while the question of how the relationship between human induced 
CO2 emissions and social factors– such as those mentioned above– might vary over time 
has been central to many of the theoretical debates and developments within the diverse 
field that constitutes the environmental social sciences, few studies to date have chosen to 
deal with the effect that the passage of time (and more particularly the changes in 
cultural, technological, and political/ institutional factors that are captured by the passage 
of time) has on the relationship between environmental impact and human activities 
directly (Jorgenson & Clark, 2012; Jorgenson, 2014; Jorgenson & Givens, 2015). Here, I 
hope to contribute to the field by using a relatively novel method to address the effect of 
factors captured by year to year changes in time, such as technological change, on per 
capita CO2 emissions, while also accounting for the modifying effect that geopolitical 
context has on this relationship. 
 In order to effectively explore the role that temporal developments play in the 
achievement of a greater or lesser degree of emissions, I use a hierarchical linear growth 
curve modeling approach to better understand how the passage of a year of time affects 
CO2 emissions per capita on average, while also controlling for the effect that a host of 
other theoretically relevant factors have on this important outcome. Further, considering 
the findings of research performed in the unequal ecological exchange and environmental 
world systems literatures (Bunker, 1984; Roberts & Grimes, 1997; Roberts, Grimes, & 
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Manale, 2003; Grimes & Kentor, 2003; York, Rosa & Dietz, 2003b; Jorgenson, 2006), I 
interact the temporal variable with the world systems strata of core, periphery and semi-
periphery in order to understand how this relationship varies within the developmental 
strictures typically placed upon nations belonging to such categories as a result of the 
contemporary structure of the geopolitical field. 
 I contextualize the findings of the present research by drawing upon several 
theoretical traditions within environmental sociology. Specifically, key theories used to 
understand study findings and to orient the research project are neomarxian theories such 
as treadmill of production (ToP), SHE, environmental world systems, and EM 
frameworks. Building upon such scholarship, I employ the methods used here to and add 
greater nuance to the tensions between neomarxian understandings of environmental 
crises and Ecological Modernization (EM) perspectives. In doing so I note that, in many 
ways, this debate acts as a proxy for the larger debate among policy makers, activists and 
academic experts surrounding the ability of technological progress and potentially 
growing ecological rationalization to mitigate anthropogenic environmental impact on its 
own (e.g. absent meaningful structural and policy reform).  
Literature review 
While scientific knowledge concerning the potentially devastating effects of 
climate change– and key anthropogenic drivers behind such changes– has grown 
immensely, several assumptions that are foundational to modernization hypotheses still 
seem to limit the incorporation of such knowledge into global mitigation strategies in a 
number of ways. The influence of the modernization school in this respect is perhaps 
most readily visible in international policy organizations’ emphasis on elaborating 
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mitigation strategies that reduce environmental impact while still maximizing economic 
growth, despite the fact that economic activity is recognized as a key contributor to 
climate change by the very same institutions (IPPC, 2014). Such strategies reflect an 
approach to achieving sustainability that still understands and measures international 
development in terms of various stages of growth (Rostow, 1959), and that seems to 
suppose that the most salient route to sustainability is likely through the introduction of a 
technical and consumption based solution that will “consistently produce such a 
countervailing effect that [it] neutralizes scale effects” (Rosa & Dietz, 2012, p. 4) of 
growth in economic activity and population size. 
Importantly, the inability to conceptualize a route to global sustainability that 
incorporates economic stability, as opposed to economic growth, has led to an adoption 
of mitigation strategies that primarily rely on the ecological rationalization that is 
outlined by Ecological Modernization (EM) theorists, such as improvements in 
technological efficiency, the establishment of environmentally conscious political 
regimes and policies, and a turn towards more environmentally friendly consumption and 
production patterns (Sonnenfeld, 2000; York & Rosa, 2003; Mol, 2010; Longo, Clark, 
Schriver & Clausen, 2016). Considering this, it is of the utmost importance that 
environmental social science research contribute to the development of a more robust 
understanding of the effectiveness of modernization strategies with respect to reducing 
environmental impact. To a large extent, much of macro-structural environmental 
sociology research has been performed with this goal in mind. A point to which I now 
turn. 
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EM theorists developed the EM framework in the last decade of the twentieth 
century in order to provide a counterpoint to the neomarxian approaches to environmental 
sociology that understand environmental crises as an inevitable outcome of 
modernization processes under capitalism. To that end, EM has focused on developing an 
understanding of emergent processes of institutional environmental reform (Mol, 
Spaargaren & Sonnenfeld, 2014).  In particular, EM proponents have focused much of 
their attention on demonstrating that as socio-economic processes and institutions 
develop, or modernize, renewed and intensified environmental concerns, and improved 
efficiency and technology can lead to the decoupling of the economy and environmental 
impact (Mol, 1997; York & Rosa 2003; York, Rosa, & Dietz, 2010). Thus, given 
sufficient time and economic growth, the introduction of environmentally protective 
political policies, and popular social movements, as well as more environmentally aware 
choices among consumers– and subsequently producers– within the market place should 
lead to a relative dematerialization of economic processes and allow for economic growth 
and environmental mitigation to be compatible (Jorgenson & Clark, 2012; Mol, 2002; 
Spaargaren & Cohen, 2009).  
The process of ‘ecological rationalization’ has been the center point of EM 
research, which has often relied upon case studies of ecologically reflexive institutions to 
demonstrate that, even if ecological modernization has not spread through our cultural 
and economic systems wholesale, there are still instances that illustrate the potential, and 
presence, of such a transition (Mol, Spaargaren & Sonnenfeld, 2014; Mol & Spaargaren, 
2000; York et al., 2010). Or, as Mol et al. note, “structural human ecology/ neo-
Malthusian perspectives diverge significantly from ecological modernization theory in 
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that the former are highly abstract, rather than richly particular” (Mol et al. 2014 p.25). 
Following the logic of modernization theory, EM proposes that the process of ecological 
rationalization is fundamental to development, and that, though more developed nations 
will experience such a rationalization first, all nations will ecologically rationalize as a 
consequence of the economic growth they may experience, as well as through gaining 
access to global flows of environmental information and goods (Jorgenson & Clark 2012; 
Mol 2010; Spaargaren & Mol, 2008). A central assumption of this approach is that, on 
the whole, progress under modernization is linear and fairly continuous and will lead to 
reductions in environmental impact (York, 2004). Yet, despite the centrality of time to 
the assumption of progress, EM research does not generally deal with, or account for, the 
potential effects of technological, cultural, or institutional factors associated with time on 
improvements in ecological outcomes empirically.  
Neomarxian and SHE perspectives have taken opposing theoretical and 
methodological approaches to EM in understanding the capacity of institutions and policy 
makers to address the environmental crisis through the modernity processes of capitalism. 
For example, ToP, which was developed by Schnaiberg (1980) to facilitate an 
understanding of the uptick in pollution and resource extraction following World War II, 
posits that due to the Iron Laws of Competition (Marx, 1976) economic processes under 
capitalism, which also entail economic expansion, will lead to ever increasing rates of 
environmental impact. Specifically, theorists in this perspective argue that as more capital 
is made available to be invested into newer and more efficient technologies, production 
processes become more and more dependent on these technologies, and capital eventually 
uses them to replace significant portions of the workforce. The replacement of human 
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labor with new technologies in leading firms has two effects, according to this 
perspective. First, as new technologies penetrate deeper into the production processes of 
society, expanded extraction of natural resources would be required in order to provide 
these new machines with the materials they require to operate properly. The second effect 
of the growing use of new technology would be that political elites, under pressure from 
industry to support expansion of production, and from workers to provide a growing job 
market, enact policies that enable businesses to easily expand into new markets and 
increase firm’s access to natural resources. This expansion, in turn, grows consumption 
levels, and, as a result, the market for new technologies steadily increases. The end result 
is a cycle, or ‘treadmill’, that requires ever-greater quantities of ecological resources, and 
produces ever-greater quantities of polluting byproducts (Gould, Pellow & Schnaiberg, 
2004; Schnaiberg, 1980; Schnaiberg & Gould, 2000). In a fashion similar to EM 
approaches, ToP has temporal processes at the center of its most foundational hypothesis. 
However, contrary to EM theories, ToP would suggest that with the passage of time there 
would be ever greater rates of financial accumulation and industrial expansion, which 
would result in more pressure being placed on environmental sinks and resources and, 
thus, ever greater environmental impacts. Critics of such theories often point to their 
apparent economic and technological determinism as weaknesses, arguing that they leave 
no space for the possibility of reform and rationalization that EM examines (Mol et al., 
2014). 
In addition to differing from the EM perspective in how it conceptualizes the role 
of temporality in socio-ecological processes, neomarxian approaches such as ToP 
understand the role that global power relations play in conditioning such processes in a 
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manner that directly challenges the logic of the modernization theory that EM builds 
upon. Importantly, EM theorists have taken great care to address concerns of 
eurocentrism within the framework (Mol et al., 2014). Thus, a greater number of EM 
studies have begun looking at processes of environmental reform, including the presence 
of environmental Kuznets curves, in countries throughout the Global North (Roach, 
2013; Shahbaz et al., 2013), Asia (Baek and Kim, 2014), and several other nations 
throughout the Global South (Tiwari et al., 2013; Chandran et al., 2013; Ahmed and Long 
2013). Other critiques of EM have claimed that the perspective ignores the global context 
of many economic and environmental processes, and have resulted in the development of 
a new international understanding of EM, which is well represented by the environmental 
flows approach Mol and others have developed (Mol & Spaargaren, 2005). However, 
while EM proponents relying on this approach often posit that global flows of resources, 
technology and information will likely lead to a reduction of impacts from social and 
economic processes across all nations, environmental world systems and unequal 
ecological exchange theorists who draw from– and contribute to– ToP and other 
neomarxian traditions argue that global power dynamics, which enable the domination of 
trade networks and conditions by a few countries, result in less powerful nations being 
forced into a position where they bear the brunt of the international community’s 
environmental burden ( Roberts & Grimes, 1997; Roberts et al., 2003; Grimes & Kentor, 
2003; York et al., 2003a; Jorgenson, 2006; Jorgenson & Clark, 2009; York & Ergas, 
2011; Ergas & York, 2012;  Prell & Sun, 2015). As a result of such a power dynamic, a 
number of neomarxian theorists argue that even if economic growth were to proceed in 
all nations, many nations would continue to pollute because, in such countries, economic 
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growth is dependent on the establishment and expansion of environmentally intensive 
economic activities.  
As has been noted above, the field of SHE has been deeply involved in the 
question of how human activities– including the introduction of new technologies, 
political policies, and cultural changes– impact the environment. One of the most 
influential strains of scholarship to deal with such questions in this tradition has been 
STIRPAT (stochastic impacts by regression on population affluence and technology). 
Contemporary STIRPAT literature, and the SHE methodologies and analyses that draw 
from it, traces its origins to the IPAT (Impacts = Population * Affluence * Technology) 
formulation (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1972; Commoner, 1972). The development of IPAT– 
which is at its heart an accounting equation whereby one can determine the value of any 
particular term so long as the other three are known– centered to a significant degree 
around debates over the role of technology in how humans impact their environment. 
Particularly, IPAT developed through a debate between Barry Commoner, who argued 
that environmental degradation was most appropriately attributed to changes in 
technology and economic growth (Commoner, 1971), and Paul Ehrlich and John 
Holdren, who believed that environmental harm was primarily driven by unrestrained 
population growth (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971). For Dietz and Rosa (1994; 1997) the 
debate between Commoner, and Ehrlich and Holdren highlighted that, due to its 
multiplicative nature, IPAT could not be used in order to identify singular causes of 
anthropogenic impact or to test hypotheses concerned with such matters (Dietz, 2013; 
Jorgenson, 2013). These realizations led to the elaboration of the IPAT equation into 
STIRPAT, a tool with which the multiplicative logic of IPAT could be subjected to 
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hypotheses testing in regression analyses. In practice, the difficulty of measuring factors 
of anthropogenic impact represented by T in the STIRPAT formulation has led to 
technology being calculated as the exponentiation of the residual in STIRPAT models 
after accounting for population and affluence (York et al., 2003b). However, a powerful 
tool in models within, and influenced by, the STRIPAT tradition has been the 
decomposition of STIRPAT components in order to more closely approximate the effect 
of technology. As Dietz notes, “it was always clear that unpacking technology would 
capture a variety of structural effects that vary across contexts” (Dietz, 2013, p 199), a 
fact which is well represented by the development of literatures which find their 
methodological impetus in the STIRPAT tradition. 
Despite the importance of the behavior of measures of pollution and sustainability 
over time to our understanding of the relationship between human activity and 
environmental impact, and what can be assumed to be a relatively strong relationship 
between time and changes in factors intended to be captured by the T of models 
influenced by STIRPAT, few works in this area have considered the relationship between 
time and impact in an immediate manner (Jorgenson & Clark, 2012; Jorgenson, 2014; 
Jorgenson & Givens, 2015). To this end, Jorgenson and Clark (2012) examined the effect 
of economic growth on CO2 emissions conditioned by time by interacting GDP per capita 
with time in five year increments. They also take global power relations into account by 
performing the analyses within the context of less developed and developed countries. 
While their findings indicated a minor decoupling of economic growth and CO2 
emissions per capita in developed countries, no such trend was found in less developed 
countries. These findings lend support to the notion that more powerful nations reduce 
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their environmental impact by exporting environmentally harmful activities to less 
powerful countries, or the ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis (Pearson, 1987). Jorgenson 
(2014) then built upon the previous work by examining the relationship between the 
carbon intensity of well-being (CIWB) and GDP per capita conditional upon time period. 
Here, time was again integrated into the study by interacting every fifth year with GDP 
per capita in five different continents, and findings demonstrated that in all continents 
except Africa economic development increased CIWB. Recently, this work has been 
furthered still, as researchers have performed a similar analysis on consumption based 
CIWB by interacting GDP per capita and time for every year from 1990 to 2008 in the 
context of both OECD and non-OECD nations (Jorgenson & Givens, 2015). Jorgenson 
and Givens (2015) suggest that economic growth was associated with declines in 
sustainability across all countries, with the effect being particularly notable in OECD 
nations– once again demonstrating that the relationship between economic development 
and impact must be understood in both a temporal and geopolitical context. 
The present study attempts to contribute to this tradition by examining the effect 
of difficult to measure factors that change through time on the CO2 emissions per capita, 
while also accounting for the position nations hold in the world system, using a 
hierarchical linear growth curve modeling approach. In performing such an analysis the 
present study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, I argue that by 
examining the association between time and CO2 per capita– while also accounting for 
power, age structure, economic development, levels of urbanization, geographic 
advantage, and contemporaneous factors– one is able to gain insight into the effect of 
difficult to measure variables that are also associated with time, such as ecological 
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awareness of a population, policy changes, and technological improvements that might 
affect how social processes relate to environmental impact. Using such a technique 
allows us to approach the issue of time in the context of sustainable development in a 
new way, and enables us to think about the debate over the role of technology in 
environmental mitigation from a different angle. Second, here I argue that, though 
interacting years with economic activity is a good way to understand how particular years 
modify the effect that growth has on impact, treating time as a continuous variable allows 
for the development of a more general understanding of how CO2 per capita has been 
impacted by those factors most directly captured by changes in time when all other 
theoretically relevant drivers of impact are accounted for. In this way, this research grants 
us insight into how the combined factors of technological change, environmental policy 
reform, and the development of ecological concern amongst consumers and producers 
effect CO2 emissions per capita in the core, semi-periphery, and periphery of the world 
system. 
Data and methods 
With the exception of world system position (WSP) all variables were drawn from 
the World Bank (2013) for the years 1960 to 2011. The dependent variable, CO2 
emissions per capita, measures CO2 emissions from liquid, gas, and solid fuel 
consumption– as well as emissions from gas flaring– in kilograms, divided by the total 
population within a given nation at a given time. It is important to note that the use of 
per-capita emissions makes the emphasis of the analysis less focused on the effect of 
population itself, and more concerned with the extent to which environmental resources, 
and CO2 emissions per capita in particular, are affected by the social activities of that 
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population. Using such a measure allows us to avoid focusing on the biological aspects of 
environmental impacts to too great a degree and ensures that the effect of social processes 
carried out by populations is highlighted. Of course, this entails a trade-off, where the 
direct effect of population is left unexplored. Additionally, it should be noted that use of 
territorial, or production-based emissions, rather than consumption based/embodied 
emissions makes the focus of the analysis on that is concerned with the general location 
of environmentally intensive processes, as opposed to identifying the true source or cause 
of such processes. This, is important, as the use of different measures of emissions will 
change the results of the analysis drastically. Here the theoretical focus is on which 
nations are most able to benefit from ecological rationality as opposed to which nations 
are most at fault for the destruction of the environment. However, drawing from theories 
of unequal ecological exchange and environmental world systems theory I highlight that 
where ecological rationality occurs cannot be disentangled from relations of power and 
exploitation. Such a consideration serves to remind us that the social cause of pollution, 
and its location, are two very different things. 
The independent variable of interest in the present study is time, which is a 
continuous variable measured in years from 1960-2011. Here, I follow previous work in 
the SHE tradition, and attempt to capture the effect of technology, which is traditionally 
viewed as being captured in the residual term of models by disaggregating a model 
component that encompasses many other relevant factors (Dietz, 2013; Jorgenson, 2013; 
McGee et al., 2015). However, while many researchers have attempted to capture the 
impact of technology by disaggregating variables that are known to be fundamental 
drivers of environmental impact–e.g. population (Liddle, 2014; Roberts, 2011), or 
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affluence (Shi, 2003; Wang et. al., 2013)– here I follow McGee et al. (2015) and attempt 
to capture technology by bringing a new component into such analyses. Yet, the present 
study also differs significantly from McGee et al. (2015) in that, where they attempt to 
capture technology by incorporating a measure of impervious surface development in a 
nation, I capture the effect of technology and ecological rationales among populations 
and policy makers by disaggregating technology using the temporal variable. Thus, I 
argue that time is of interest because, when all time varying covariates that are 
theoretically important to understanding the relationship between social activity and 
emissions are accounted for, what time then represents are those theoretically relevant 
drivers of impact which we are unable to measure, such as technological progress– 
including those technologies associated with the spread and intensification of impervious 
surfaces–, political regime change, and ecological awareness, albeit in an imperfect 
manner. To that end, the controls included in the models presented below account for a 
number of factors that are known to have an effect on CO2 emissions per capita and to 
vary significantly over time. Specifically, urbanization, age structure of the population, 
and GDP per capita are included in the models in order to control for factors relevant to 
CO2 emissions per capita that are easily measurable and highly time-variant.  
 I account for power in geopolitical relations by relying upon the WSP measures 
created by Clark and Beckfield (2009). In order to test for robustness in findings, 
alternative analyses to those presented here were performed using the more traditional, 
Snyder and Kick (1979), WSP indicator. The findings reported below were robust across 
both measures of power. There are 91 nations for which information on environmental 
indicators and WSP are available that are included in the present study. 
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 Though I use both Snyder and Kick (1979) and Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) 
measure of world system position in this study, I focus my analysis on those models 
using Clark and Beckfield’s measure because it provides a greater level of parsimony. 
Specifically, while both measures of WSP are created using network block modeling 
techniques, the Snyder and Kick (1979) measure performs its block calculations using an 
index variable that consists of trade flows, treaty participation, occurrence of military 
intervention, and the presence of diplomatic relations. The Clark and Beckfield (2009) 
measure only relies on trade network centrality. The result of this is that, though the 
Snyder and Kick measure acts as an effective gauge of placement in the World System, 
the Clark and Beckfield measure is a more easily interpretable measure of power for the 
purposes of the present study. 
 Importantly, the models used in this study assume that world system position is 
relatively fixed in the 51-year period being examined. While the degree of mobility of 
nations within the world system is an unsettled issue, there is a precedent of treating the 
position of nations as fixed over periods of time that may be considered brief relative to 
the 550-year time span that the modern world system has developed within (Snyder & 
Kick, 1979; Clark & Beckfield, 2009). Understanding this, I contend that the position of 
power held by a nation in the international economy during the early years of the postwar 
era was one of many key factors that contributed to the adoption of political, social, and 
economic policy programs that were determinative with regards to the ways the nation 
interacted with the environment over the period of time observed in this study. In order to 
test this assumption, an alternative model was explored where world system position was 
enabled to be slightly dynamic by allowing for a change in world system position 
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following the year 1989. To do so, change in national WSP was coded according to 
Clark’s (2012) updated WSP indicator. Findings did not differ substantially from those 
presented below, and, as a result, I focus on the more parsimonious (fixed WSP) model. 
 With the exception of WSP and time, all variables in the study were natural log 
transformed, making the coefficients of such variables presented in the models below 
elasticities. The result of this is that all coefficients below represent the percent change in 
















Mean GDP Per Capita 
 
11241.67 18105.05 7507.357 3572.61 
Maximum GDP Per 
Capita 
 
81947.24 67804.55 81947.24 61662.50 
Minimum GDP Per 
Capita 
 
113.8766 150.55 408.72 113.87 
Mean CO2 Per Capita 
 
1.83e-06 2.63e-06 1.73e-06 7.45e-07 
Maximum CO2 Per 
Capita 
 
1.97e-05 1.18e-05 1.97e-05 1.1e-05 
Minimum CO2 Per 
Capita 
 
1.28e-10 3.49e-08 9.40e-09 1.28e-10 





 I use a hierarchical linear growth curve model, with years nested within nations, 
to perform the analyses presented below. Such an approach is beneficial, as hierarchical 
linear models entail a precise weighting operation that prevent the biasing of coefficients 
or standard errors by unusual observations or panel sizes. Additionally, the clustering of 
years within nations serves to control for both contemporaneous and extemporaneous 
effects. Controlling for these two factors serves to limit the influence of omitted variable 
bias substantially. Further accounting for contemporaneous factors, or the clustering of 
years, allows for the effect of changes from one year to another, such as changes in 
technology, culture, policies, and institutions to be captured within the time variable. 
Thus, the effect of a 1-year change in time corresponds to the average effect of within 
nation changes of such factors. The general structure of the hierarchical linear growth 
curve model used here is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑂2𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
2) + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡
2 )
+ 𝛽5(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6𝑖(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑡 
 
𝛽0𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽7(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽9(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑖) + 𝜇0𝑖 










Level 1: e0it~N(0, 2e0) 
 
Where CO2PCit represents the log of per capita carbon dioxide emissions of the ith nation 
in year t; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the logged value of nation i’s GDP per capita in time period t; 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
2  is the log of the quadratic term for country i in year t; 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the log of the 
percent of the population living in urban areas in nation i during year t. 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡
2  is the 
quadratic term for the log of urban population percentage; timeit is the value of the 
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variable time in country i during year t; 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the binary measurement of the periphery 
status of nation i;  𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑖  is the binary measurement of the semi-periphery status of nation 
i; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the binary measurement of the core status of nation i; 𝑒0𝑖𝑡 is the residual 
difference in CO2 emissions per capita for the ith country in year t; 𝜇0𝑖 is the residual 
differential CO2 emissions per capita value for country i when all predictor variables are 
held at 0; 𝜇1𝑖 is the residual difference in CO2 emissions per capita change for nation i for 
every additional 1 unit increase in time. 𝜎𝑢0
2  represents the between nation variance in 
CO2 emissions per capita; 𝜎𝑢1
2  is the between nation variance in CO2 emissions per capita 
change for every 1 unit increase in time. 
Results and discussion 
 
 The results of the hierarchical linear growth curve model analyses are presented in 
table 2 below. Model A demonstrates the effect of time on CO2 emissions per capita 
absent of any theoretically relevant time variant controls. The results indicate that every 
year of temporal change, on average, results in a .025 percent increase in CO2 emissions 
per capita. 
 Model B examines the effect that time has on CO2 emissions per capita while 
holding constant theoretically relevant variables, without taking global power structure 
into consideration. Findings suggest that, outside the effect of changes in population, 
economic development, and urbanization –which are controlled for in both model B and 
model C– time has no effect on CO2 emissions per capita when context is not considered.  
Model C controls for all theoretically relevant time variant variables and also 
examines variation in the effect of time in nations belonging the core, semi-periphery and 
the periphery. Findings suggest that in the core, a one year increase in the temporal 
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variable– or, put differently, a one year change in technologies, ecological 
awareness/concern, political regimes, and environmental policies–  is associated with an 
increase of .01 percent in CO2 emissions per capita. The effect of time variant factors on 
CO2 emissions decreases by .009 percent in semi-periphery nations, resulting in an 
increase of .001 percent in kilograms of CO2 emissions per capita being associated with a 
change of 1 year. Interestingly, periphery nations are found to have an even greater 
decrease in the effect that time has on CO2 emissions per capita, .0159, suggesting that in 
such nations the passage of a year of time is associated with a slight decrease of .0059 
percent in CO2 emissions per capita on average. The graphic representation of these 
relationships can be seen in figure 1. With the exception of the working age ratio 
variable, all regression coefficients reported in model C were found to be statistically 
significant at the .001 alpha level with a two tailed test. Considering the importance of 
questions around the impact that economic growth has on environment health, it is 
important to note that model C indicates that there is an attenuation in the relationship 
between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita, such that as GDP per capita 
reaches very high levels its effect on emissions decreases substantially. Importantly, this 
research does not examine if, or how, this relationship is modified by power differentials 
in the global economy, which is an important consideration in such discussions. 
Additionally, I note that the relationship between GDP per capita and emissions remains 
positive throughout the range of observed values. Thus, the model indicates that even 
when nations achieve what might be seen as unusually high levels of GDP per capita 
($81,947.24) economic growth is still found to result in increases in emissions. 
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Likelihood ratio tests between model B and C suggest that model C provides the best fit 
to the data, as a result I focus the discussion on this model. 
Overall, the findings presented here suggest that factors captured by the passage 
of time that, as of yet, are not able to be directly measured and controlled for on the 
international scale– such as technological change, changes in policy approaches and 
political regimes at the national and international level, and changes in the level of 
ecological concern among producers and consumers– do have a significant effect on CO2 
emissions per capita. While the association of time and CO2 is modest in all world 
systems categories, it is also found to be highly significant, and, importantly, significantly 
different in every world system strata.  
The findings of the present research complicate our understanding of the role that 
social factors that change over time have on CO2 emissions in interesting ways. For 
example, the fact that all three world systems categories have relationships that are 
significantly different from one another  provides support for the supposition of 
environmental world systems scholars that, due to the nature of power relations in the 
international economy, nations holding different positions in the world system will have 
notably different social and economic structures, which will ultimately lead to notable 
differences in the impact that such nations have on the environment. Thus, as figure 1 
demonstrates, time is associated with increases in CO2 emissions per capita to a greater 
degree in core nations than it is in the semi-periphery, and is associated with decreases in 
CO2 emissions per capita in the periphery. However, the specific relationship between 
time variant factors of interest and CO2 emissions per capita do not necessarily support a 
world systems understanding of how such a relationship should play out in each world 
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system category. For example, if this relationship is viewed through the environmental 
world systems lens, then it might be considered surprising that all nations in the analysis 
except for those belonging to the periphery express a positive association between time 
and emissions. In particular, this finding seems to challenge the well-established 
‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis (Pearson, 1987), where core nations improve socio-
ecological relations by exporting environmentally harmful production processes to 
nations in the semi-periphery and periphery. Despite this apparent contradiction, if 
viewed with an eye towards consumption, then these findings do seem to offer support to 
environmental world systems hypotheses, which note that labor forces in such nations, 
“being poorly paid, cannot constitute an important consumer market” (Roberts, Grimes, 
& Manale, 2003). This insight, when taken in conjunction with insights of from the 
‘displacement paradox’– which notes that new technologies are often used in addition to, 
as opposed to in place of, older technologies, and the ‘Jevon’s paradox’, which argues 
that increases in technological efficiency often lead to the technology being used by 
consumers at greater rates (York, 2006; York & McGee, 2016)– literatures provides a 
plausible explanation of these initially surprising findings. Considering these theoretical 
contributions, we should not necessarily be surprised to see factors such as technological 
change, policy change, and increasing ecological concern associated with increases in 
emissions in the core, as it is possible that 1) new technologies, particularly in the energy 
sector, are being used in order to expand markets in the core, rather than replacing older 
technologies (York, 2012), and 2) increases in efficiency are leading to increases in 
consumption, as has recently been found to be the case in the United States with 
alternative fuel vehicles (McGee, 2017). 
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The existence of a positive relationship between time variant factors and 
emissions in the semi-periphery indicates that these nations might be experiencing 
increases in emissions as a result of taking on environmentally harmful production 
processes in order to provide consumer goods for nations in the core. Thus, this finding 
offers support for environmental world system’s ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis (Pearson, 
1987; Roberts, Grimes, & Manale, 2003).  
   The negative relationship between the temporal variable and emissions in 
nations in the periphery offers support to both environmental world systems theory and to 
Mol’s theory of environmental flows. Specifically, we should expect periphery nations to 
release fewer production and consumption related emissions (Smith & White, 1992; Van 
Rossem, 1996; Roberts, Grimes, & Manale, 2003) than those belonging to the semi-
periphery and core due to the fact that such nations often rely on niche economies (such 
as tourism) or human and non-human animal labor to grow their GDP, but such nations 
often still have access to some of the benefits of technological change that EM, and 
environmental flows theory in particular, notes is fundamental to ecological 
rationalization. 
While these findings offer support to the notion that flows of environmental goods 
and information will benefit less powerful countries in the global economy, they also 
challenge the hypothesis of EM that all nations will improve in their relationship to the 
environment, given enough time, as a result of a global process of ecological 
rationalization. Rather, the findings presented here suggest that, in the majority of 
nations, time dependent factors are associated with increases in CO2 emissions per capita. 
It is important to note that, as indicated above, the majority of emissions have historically 
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come from nations belonging to the core and the semi-periphery (as can be seen in table 
1), as a result, we should expect that– supposing the trends observed here continue– CO2 




Table 1.2. Hierarchical Linear Growth Curve Model of the Effect of Time on CO2 
Emissions Per Capita. 
Variable Model A Model B Model C 
Level 1 Variables    




























Level 2 Variables    
Periphery _ _ 30.676*** 
(3.340) 
Semi-Periphery _ _ 16.848*** 
(3.881) 
Core (reference) – – – 
Cross Level 
Interactions 
   
Year*Periphery _ _ -.0158*** 
(.002) 
Year*Semi-Periphery _ _ -.009*** 
(.002) 
Year*Core (reference) – – – 
Constant -50.873 -10.346 -27.347 
Variance Terms    
𝜎𝑒𝑜
2  (Year level) 0.293 0.225 0.219 
𝜎𝑢𝑜
2  (Country level) 4.393 1.606 0.278 
𝜎𝑢1
2  – – 3.03e-7 
 Notes: All models include 91 nations and 3556 nation-years. p<.001***; standard errors 












 This chapter draws from structural human ecology, neomarxian environmental 
theory, environmental world systems theory, EM literature, and uses a hierarchical linear 
growth curve modeling approach in order to examine the association between social 
factors associated with environmental impact that change over time, and CO2 emissions 
per capita in the world system. Using such an approach, I examine the debate between 
EM theorists and environmental world systems proponents in a novel way. By using time 
in order to disaggregate technology, I gain insight into the contentious issue of the extent 
to which the aggregate of changes in technological efficiency, policy approaches, and the 
ecological awareness of producers and consumers affect emissions at the national level.  
Building on work that has found that changes in time modify the relationship 
between economic activity and emissions, I find that the relationship between time and 
CO2 emissions per capita is statistically significant, as well as statistically different across 
world systems strata. In particular, the findings here suggest that in all nations except for 
those belonging to the periphery time is positively associated with CO2 emissions per 
capita, with the strongest association being in the core of the world system. This finding 
suggests that, outside of the periphery, the process of ecological rationalization is not 
working to reduce the rate of emissions over time, and supports the argument of SHE and 
environmental world systems scholars that broader structural changes will likely need to 
be made to the global economy if we hope to reduce the environmental impact of social 
processes.  
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In a broader sense, the findings presented in this study suggest that assumptions 
that temporal progress in technological change, ecological awareness, and 
environmentally friendly policies and political regimes lead to a gradual decline in the 
environmental impact of social processes are not necessarily valid, at least insofar as 
greenhouse gas emissions are concerned. What’s more, the findings presented here 
indicate that the modernist assumption of global economic processes leading to 
increasing similarities in the way that nations relate to the environment is a questionable 
one, and that, in fact, nation’s that belong to different world systems positions– or have 
notably different levels of control over their trade network and, thus, their role in the 
international economy and production chain– have trajectories of growth in CO2 
emissions per capita that are decidedly different from one another. The implication of 
these findings is that international policy makers must account for such difference as they 
attempt to outline pathways to sustainability for all nations. Further, the findings 
presented above suggest that– at both the national and the international level– policy 
makers must take a more active role in ensuring that social structures and processes 
become more environmentally benign, rather than assuming that socio-ecologically 
sustainable societies will roll in on the wheels of inevitability. To that end, the findings of 
this study point in two broad research directions. First, as data becomes more readily 
available, efforts must be made to track the effect of those factors that were captured by 
time in this study on carbon dioxide emissions per capita more precisely. Second, it is 
important that comparative and qualitative work be done in order to better understand 
what causes the relationship between time and CO2 emissions to differ across world 
system positions, as well as what interventions might successfully limit these differences. 
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In the chapter that follows, I will explore how the relationship between economic 
growth and emissions differs in varying strata of the world system. Further, I will 
examine how much of the variation in emissions is explained by a nations position in the 
world system, allowing for the exploration of how deeply global inequality among nation 





DIVERGENT PATHWAYS: THE IMPACT THAT A 
HIERARCHICAL WORLD SYSTEM HAS ON THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
A version of this chapter was published in Socius with Julius Alexander McGee (Greiner 
and McGee 2018). My Co-author helped to frame the argument, helped to develop the 
modeling approach, and wrote the section on the Environmental Kuznets Curve, as well 
as parts of the conclusion. 
 
 It is now accepted by climate scientists that the environmental conditions which 
allowed for the initial growth and establishment of human civilizations is in a period of 
rapid transition. Further, it is now known that one of the primary causes of the rapid shift 
in the ecological conditions that house human activities are human technologies and 
social organizations (Rockström et al., 2009). As a result of this knowledge, it has been 
one of the primary aims of environmental sociology, and other environmental social 
sciences, to identify the key social drivers of the current environmental change. In several 
instances, this concern has taken the form of examinations of the relationship between 
economic growth at the national level and environmental degradation (See Jorgenson and 
Clark 2012; York et al. 2003a; 2003b York and Rosa 2012).  
 Despite a shared concern for environmental outcomes among the researchers who 
interrogate such matters, there has been a general split in the understanding of the 
environmental impacts of economic growth among social science researchers. Generally 
speaking, this divide can be drawn between environmental economists from the 
neoclassical school- as well as a number of environmental sociologists- who believe that, 
ultimately, economic growth can work to decrease environmental impacts of social 
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activity and benefit the environment, and structural human ecologists (SHE) and world 
systems theorists who argue that economic growth has a continuously negative effect on 
environmental health. While acknowledging that economic development has historically 
had a negative effect on the environment as a whole, many environmental economists and 
sociologists (see Shahbaz, Mutascu, & Azim, 2013; Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw & 
Craig Jenkins 2002)  argue that regulations on business and trade eventually reverse this 
relationship, leading to a correlation between environmental impacts and economic 
growth that resembles an inverted U shaped curve. This relationship is commonly 
referred to as an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Grossman and Krueger 1991; 
Dinda 2004). Contrary to this, researchers in the field of human ecology and world 
systems have noted that the conceptual framework of the EKC fails to take into account 
the global nature of contemporary economies, (York, Rosa, & Dietz  2003a, 2003b; 
Dietz, Rosa &York 2007; Rice 2007) pointing out that in many instances wealthy and 
powerful nations are able to decrease their impacts only by exporting their 
environmentally harmful activities and industries to less powerful nations that are in 
search of ways to grow their economy.  
 In the field of environmental sociology, the tension between those who claim to 
find an EKC and those who argue that economic growth is deeply, if not inherently, tied 
to the degradation of ecological resources has played out in the debate between the 
proponents of Ecological Modernization theory (Mol & Spaargaren 2000) and those of 
Treadmill of Production theory (Schnaiberg 1980). Within this debate, Ecological 
Modernization theory has traditionally attempted to demonstrate the ‘ecological 
rationalization’ of social and economic processes, and thus support the EKC hypothesis, 
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by performing case studies of ecologically reflexive institutions, noting that even if 
ecological modernization has not spread through our cultural and economic systems 
wholesale, there are still instances that illustrate the potential, and possible presence, of 
such a transition (Mol & Spaargaren 2000; York et al. 2010). 
Contrary to Ecological Modernization Theory, Treadmill of Production has 
typically attempted to demonstrate the ties between economic growth and environmental 
degradation globally by performing macro-level cross-national analyses (Gould et al. 
2004; Liddle 2013; Rudel & Horowitz 1993; York et al. 2003a), recognizing that both 
capitalist processes of accumulation and the environmental impact that might come of 
them are now global in their scope (Grimes & Kentor 2003). As a result of this global 
focus, and the recognition that economically and ecologically exploitative relationships 
between the global North and the global South are inherent to the functioning of 
capitalism and, thus, to understanding the Treadmill of Production, a non-trivial body of 
literature has merged the Treadmill of Production theory into a World Systems 
framework, using the logic of STIRPAT modeling approaches, in order to refute the 
contention of EKC proponents that, given adequate growth and time, all nations will 
experience a decline in emission levels (Ergas & York 2012; Ewing 2017; Jorgenson 
2006, 2007, 2012; Jorgenson & Clark 2009; Liddle 2013; Rudel & Horowitz 1993; York 
& Rosa 2003; York et al. 2003a). 
Here, we take a novel approach to examining the tensions in the debate 
surrounding the EKC and utilize a random coefficients model to examine how a nation’s 
placement in the world system modifies its relationship between economic growth and 
environmental impacts, measured as CO2 emissions per capita. The random coefficients 
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approach allows us to analyze the development of this relationship over time (a common 
way of assessing the effect of economic growth on CO2 emissions), and also examine 
whether the majority of variation in CO2 emissions is more appropriately understood as 
attributable to time invariant nation state characteristics or to attributes that vary from 
year to year. In other words, we are able to assess whether most variation in CO2 
emissions per capita is attributable to across, or within unit differences. In the present 
study we have specified time as the first level of analysis, which we use to examine the 
effect of theoretically relevant time variant predictors. We have specified countries as the 
second level– to which we have associated the relatively stable/ time invariant predictor 
of world system position. Though we recognize that world system position is a time 
variant characteristic, here we argue that a nation’s world system position in the years 
following the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions is an important predictor of 
the role it would play in the global economy throughout our range of observations. As a 
result, we treat world system position at the beginning of the 1960s as a time invariant 
characteristic. By examining the strength and direction of the association between growth 
and impact, and the amount of variation that is attributable to time dependent predictors 
relative to geopolitical structure predictors, we are able to speak to the EKC/SHE debate 
in a new way. Namely, such an approach enables us to examine the extent to which we 
can expect time dependent variables, such as GDP and urban population size, to alleviate 
environmental impact relative to variables associated with the structure of the modern 
world system.  
If common interpretations of the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis are 
correct, then we should expect to find that most nations have a relationship between GDP 
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per capita and CO2 emissions per capita that resembles an inverted U, and that the 
majority of variation is attributable to level 1 (time dependent) variables. However, the 
logic of structural human ecology and world systems theory would suggest that the 
Environmental Kuznets curve will be specific to those nations that wield the most power 
in the world system (i.e. the core). While the less powerful countries of the semi-
periphery and the periphery will have a relationship between GDP and CO2 emissions 
that greatly limits their ability to use economic growth as a tool to prevent negative 
environmental impacts. Further, according to such theories we should expect to find that 
the majority of variation in CO2 emissions is attributable to level 2 (country level/time 
stable) variables, as opposed to level 1 (time variant) variables. 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis 
 The Environmental Kuznets Curve was first presented empirically in an NBER 
working paper by Grossman and Krueger (1991), who identified an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between SO2 emissions and smoke, and income per capita. The authors noted 
that while initially environmental pollution increased alongside income per capita, there 
was a point in which income per capita became associated with declines in environmental 
pollution. Grossman and Krueger used the name “Kuznet” to describe the phenomenon 
due to its resemblance to Simon Kuznet’s famous Kuznets Curve hypothesis (1955), 
which found an inverted U-shaped curve between income inequality and economic 
growth. The term Environmental Kuznets Curve was later coined by Panayotou (1992) to 
describe a similar pattern identified between deforestation and air pollution, and per 
capita income. Since the 1990s, the EKC has been applied as a hypothesis to numerous 
forms of environmental degradation and processes of modernization, which are not 
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limited to measurements of economic development. For example, Ehrhardt-Martinez et 
al. (2002) and Choumert et al. (2013) demonstrated that an inverted U-shaped 
relationship existed between urbanization and deforestation.  
Since our analysis focuses on the EKC with regard to CO2 emissions, here we 
place particular emphasis on research examining the relationship between CO2 emissions 
and economic growth. Numerous studies have found evidence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between CO2 emissions and economic development within specific nations -- 
Shahbaz et al. (2013; Romania), Tiwari et al. (2013; India), Chandran et al. (2013; India), 
Ahmed and Long (2013; Pakistan), Roach (2013; across US states), and Baek and Kim 
(2014; Korea). In these analyses, emphasis is often placed on the effects of environmental 
policy. For instance, Chandran et al. suggests that the existence of an EKC in India (or 
what they call a bi-directional relationship) and not in China is due to environmental 
degradation affecting economic growth in India and not in China. They conclude that 
China is capable of reducing CO2 emissions from coal without reducing economic growth 
through increased efficiency and renewable energy production. While there is obvious 
merit to nation-specific analyses, the policy recommendations in these analyses often 
ignore the transnational residual effect of policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions. Sinn 
(2012) argues that laws aimed at reducing CO2 emissions in specific nations often 
influence transnational corporations to increase fossil fuel production elsewhere. Thus 
assessing the cross-national pattern of CO2 emissions’ connection to economic growth is 
necessary to understand the extent to which environmental policy leads to an EKC. 
 Chow and Li (2014) and Ibrahim and Law (2014) have recently each found 
evidence of an EKC between CO2 emissions and economic growth cross-nationally using 
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panel data. While each of these analyses, which are only the most recent studies of EKC 
and CO2 emissions, find evidence for an EKC in both developing and developed 
countries, there is no discussion of the theoretical implications of the EKC (in fact this is 
explicitly stated by Chow and Li) or of power and the relationship between nations. As 
Dinda (2004) points out in a review of EKC research, empirically, the EKC describes a 
dynamic process of change, where the relationship between economic growth and 
environmental degradation is expected to change at different levels of economic 
development. Thus, empirically the EKC is simply a description of relative changes in 
the relationship between environmental output and economic development. However, the 
lack of theoretical insight in cross sectional analyses of EKC and CO2 emissions and the 
limited discussion of the transnational implications of national policies can produce 
numerous empirical problems that we intend address in this study.     
In a Marxist critique of the EKC, Lynch (2016) acknowledges numerous 
inconsistencies across EKC analyses, noting that there is no consistent methodology or 
unit of analysis particular to EKC research. The author contends that traditional 
interpretations of the EKC as an empirical phenomenon are too optimistic and fail to 
understand the broader economic context in which anthropogenic environmental 
pollution is produced. Lynch (2016) interprets the existence of an EKC through a Marxist 
perspective, arguing that the EKC is merely a pattern that fits the traditional Marxist 
critique of capitalism nationally and globally. Within nations, Lynch contends that the 
existence of an EKC is an inadvertent consequence of “profit-making” driving 
technological change or changes in input use. Globally, the author argues that the 
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existence of an EKC in “core” nations is a product of patterns inherent to global 
capitalism, where production is shifted from developed to developing nations.          
 In contrast to Lynch’s perspective, proponents of EKC argue that the attenuating 
relationship between economic development and environmental degradation is mostly a 
result of policies, regulations, and individual actions prompted by a general increase in 
awareness of environmental conditions, as well as a shift away from industrial production 
to service based economies (Dinda 2004). As noted above, in environmental sociology 
Ecological Modernization Theory (see Mol 2000; Mol. et al. 2009) presents prevailing 
discourses pertaining to environmental policy and strategic industrial techniques based on 
the assumption that an EKC is a common outcome of economic development (Buttel 
1987). Under this school of thought, scholars contend that the trajectory of economic 
development is linear, noting that the existence of an EKC in developed countries is a 
pattern that will soon be followed in developing countries. While recent cross-sectional 
analyses argue that the EKC is now visible in both developed in developing nations, we 
contend that this is due to theoretical oversights in overtly empirical assessments of the 
EKC.  
Building on the Lynch’s (2016) critique of the EKC, we contend that the lack of 
theoretical depth in EKC analyses, specifically those that explore the relationship 
between CO2 emissions and economic development, as well as the lack of consistency 
across empirical studies, generates problems in the empirical assessment of the EKC and 
CO2 emissions. Specifically, we argue that, currently, empirical analyses of the EKC and 
CO2 emissions on a global scale, fail to acknowledge the variation in nations’ 
relationships with each other and their internal relationships to economic growth. Similar 
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to Lynch, we argue that the existence of an EKC should be understood through a more 
critical lens, which acknowledges that the EKC is a product of unequal relationships 
between nation-states that the current structure of the global economy is predicated on. 
To this end, cross-national empirical assessments of the EKC and CO2 emissions should 
attempt to acknowledge the power dynamics that exist between nations in their analyses. 
While we acknowledge that no empirical analysis can fully incorporate the variation in 
relationships between nations, we believe methodologies exists that, at the very least, 
address a variety of broad theoretical concerns. What follows is a brief overview of the 
insights developed in World Systems theory and research on Unequal Ecological 
Exchange that we use to craft a more appropriate assessment of the EKC and CO2 
emissions.        
World Systems Analysis and Unequal Ecological Exchange 
In the past several decades, environmental scholars have begun to incorporate 
world systems theory as an analytical tool to examine how global political economic 
structure influences environmental impacts (Bunker 1984; Burns, Davis & Kick 1997; 
Chew 2001; Ergas & York 2012; Grimes & Kentor 2003; Hornborg 2009; Jorgenson 
2003; Jorgenson 2007; Jorgenson & Clark 2009; Roberts & Grimes 1997; Roberts, 
Grimes, & Manale 2003; York et al. 2003a). World systems theory was developed in the 
early 1970s to facilitate the application of neo-Marxist strains of political economic 
thought to the function of the global economy within the historical context of the 
capitalist economic system (Chase-Dunn & Grimes 1995; Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 2004). 
Traditionally, world systems theory focused on the structured hierarchy of the global 
economy and the developmental constraints faced by some nations while attempting to 
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grow their economies as a result of this hierarchy. World systems theorists argue that 
developmental pathways and economic factors, such as trade partners, labor policies, and 
environmental regulations, shape the products that nations might choose to produce and 
dictate how businesses operate in such nations, which in turn affects the ways in which a 
nation’s population is environmentally and economically exploited (Bunker 1984; Chase-
Dunn & Grimes 1995; Roberts et al. 2003; Jorgenson 2003). To this end, Jorgenson 
(2003) demonstrated that of a variety of social structural factors– such as urbanization, 
literacy rates, and domestic inequality– it was world system position which acted as the 
strongest positive predictor of a nation’s ecological footprint. 
The work of world systems researchers has typically centered on the domination 
of the global economy by core nations– which are economically, militarily, and 
politically preeminent– at the expense of nations in the periphery and, to a lesser degree, 
semi-periphery, which have historically been economically and politically disadvantaged 
as a result of the legacy of colonial operations within their country. Within this schema it 
is argued that core nations exploit all other nations through geopolitical relations and the 
control of economic trade networks, while semi-periphery nations occupy a position of 
domination over those nations that belong to the periphery, and thus are unique in their 
propensity to both exploit and be exploited (Clark & Beckfield 2009; Snyder & Kick 
1979; Wallerstein 1974). Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 2004) has noted that it is the presence 
of such an intermediate category of nations, which simultaneously benefit from the 
hierarchical structure of the world system and are exploited by it, that lends stability to 
the structure, and prevents exploited nations from attempting to restructure the political 
and economic relations that characterize the capitalist global economy. 
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Drawing from orthodox world systems traditions (Wallerstein 1974), as well as 
from dependency theory (Frank 1967), subsequent work focused on the extraction and 
progressive underdevelopment of the global periphery (Bunker 1984), as well as the 
development of a new international division of labor wherein industrial sectors that are 
relatively environmentally benign (e.g. the service industry) began to be concentrated in 
core nations. Meanwhile, hazardous activities increasingly began to take place within 
nations belonging to the periphery and semi-periphery (Fröbel, Heinrichs, & Kreye 1981; 
Roberts & Grimes 1997; Roberts et al. 2003; Schoenberger 1988). 
Burns et al. (1997), in one of the earliest empirical analyses of the effect of world 
systems position on the environment, found that core nations were associated with the 
highest levels of CO2 emissions. The authors also find that semi-core and semi-periphery 
nations had the highest levels of methane emissions due at least impart to the movement 
of agribusiness from core nations to these regions. In an additional analysis, Burns et al. 
(2003) note that between 1990 and 2000 deforestation occurred with the greatest intensity 
in the periphery, followed closely by the semi-periphery, while increasing affluence was 
found to slow deforestation globally. 
Though we do not directly test such theories in the analyses presented here, the 
theoretical reliance of the present work on developments within the field of unequal 
ecological exchange renders a discussion of this theory beneficial. Contemporary work in 
the field of unequal ecological exchange has demonstrated how politically and 
economically privileged countries belonging to the global core have exported the 
environmental costs of their economic activities to poorer nations within the global 
economy (Grimes & Kentor 2003; Jorgenson 2006; Jorgenson & Clark 2009; Prell & Sun 
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2015). Highlighting the importance of the export of ecological goods from poorer nations 
to wealthy– militarily powerful– nations, unequal ecological exchange studies have used 
trade measures as continuous variables in order to examine the effect of exports and 
imports between nations on ecological outcomes (Jorgenson 2006; Jorgenson & Clark 
2009; Prell & Sun 2015). Such an approach has illuminated how trade relations are 
exploited within the world system in ways that allow for core nations to maintain the 
health of their ecological resources, even as their economic activities continue to drive 
environmental degradation elsewhere. For example, recent research has demonstrated 
that nations occupying peripheral positions within the global economy tend to have 
increased levels of environmental degradation as their levels of exports to other countries 
grow (Jorgenson & Clark 2009; Jorgenson & Clark 2011; Rice 2007). Similarly, previous 
research in this field has suggested that, while there may be a relative decoupling of 
economic growth and environmental impact in the more geopolitically advantaged 
nations of the global core, the same relationship does not hold for nations that do not 
belong to the upper quartile of the World Bank’s income classification of nations 
(Jorgenson & Clark 2012). The present study attempts to build upon these traditions by 
using a relatively novel modeling approach to examine if there is a meaningful difference 
in the relationship between environmental impact and economic growth among nations 
holding different world systems positions. 
Hypotheses 
Keeping in mind the work in the fields of environmental world systems, unequal 
ecological exchange, dependency theory, and the EKC, we argue that the 
environmentally destructive trade relations that these fields illuminate are borne out of 
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advantages held by core nations that are inherent to their status as core countries in the 
world system. Considering this, we hold that, due to qualitative differences in their 
economic structures, nations belonging to different groupings in the world system at the 
beginning of our observed time period will have a significantly different relationship 
between economic growth and atmospheric pollution as measured by CO2 emissions per 
capita. Specifically, we follow the work of previous environmental world systems 
scholars (Roberts & Grimes 1997; Burns, Davis & Kick 1997; Roberts et al. 2003) in 
arguing that nations in the core will likely have a relationship between economic growth 
and environmental pollution that resembles an environmental Kuznets curve as a result of 
their ability to export a number of their environmentally harmful activities to nations 
belonging to the semi-periphery, which falls in line with research concerning other 
indicators of environmental impact as well (Burns et al. 2003). Considering this, we 
hypothesize that nations belonging to the semi-periphery will likely have a relationship 
that is monotonically positive or increases geometrically, as such nations have often 
grown their economies by employing low standards of labor regulation and 
environmental protection, while simultaneously growing their industrial capabilities in 
order to act as manufacturers for multi-national corporations whose markets are often 
centered in core nations (Roberts et al. 2003). Additionally, we suspect that periphery 
nations will likely have a relationship that appears to be relatively flat and stable– though 
on average such nations should have notably lower CO2 emissions– as these nations often 
grow their economies via the extraction of raw environmental resources through the use 
of human or non-human animal energy (Smith & White 1992; Van Rossem 1996), or by 
 63 
participating in specialized industries such as tourism and banking– none of which have a 
particularly notable effect of CO2 emissions (Roberts et al. 2003). 
As noted above, much of the debate surrounding the EKC is deeply tied to the 
question of whether or not the majority of variation in CO2 emissions is attributable to 
differences within or across nations. Put differently, one could argue that the EKC debate, 
in no insignificant way, is tied to the question of whether or not changes in factors that 
are highly responsive to temporal variation– such as GDP or urban population size– can 
potentially account for, and thus be used to mitigate, CO2 emissions or if factors that are 
insensitive to the passage of time– those such as colonial legacies, resource presence and 
absence, and world system position at a critical point in world history– are also important 
factors in understanding and addressing climate change. Understanding this aspect of the 
EKC and the theoretical discussions that surround it, here we hypothesize that the 
analysis of variance that is permitted by the random coefficients model used in the 
present study will yield a variance partition coefficient (VPC) that indicates that the 
majority of variation in CO2 emissions per capita is attributable to factors associated with 
the nation, such as its place in the global economic structure in the years following the 
establishment of supranational institutions, rather than those factors that express year to 
year within nation changes.  
Data 
 
 With the exception of the world system placement variable, the dependent 
variable, as well as all independent variables, used for this study were gathered from the 
World Bank’s ‘world development indicators’ database (2015). The world development 
indicators database provides information on a wide range of topics for 214 nations from 
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the year 1960-2015. In the present study data is included for 91 countries for the years 
1960-2011. Descriptive statistics of these variables are reported in table 1. 
 The dependent variable of interest in the present study is carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita. In order to construct this variable, we divided the World 
development indicator’s carbon dioxide emission variable, which measures CO2 
emissions from liquid, gas and solid fuel consumption, as well as emissions from gas 
flaring, in kilotons, by the total population within a given nation at a given time.  
 Seven independent variables are included in the analysis. The primary 
independent variables of interest are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and 
world system position. GDP per capita is measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars and is 
generated by the World Bank by dividing a nation’s gross domestic product by its mid-
year population size. The World Bank measures GDP as the sum of gross product that is 
added by producers that are residents of the nation being examined plus the difference of 
product taxes and subsidies that are not included in the final calculation of a product's 
value. GDP per capita does not include depreciations for either environmental 
degradation or fabricated assets.       
 World system position consists of three categorical, binary coded, variables that 
are intended to measure power in the global economy and geopolitical environment. We 
follow the traditional literature in world systems analysis and allow each country to 
belong to one, and only one, of the three world systems classifications. Thus, nations can 
belong to the core, the periphery, or the semi-periphery. We utilize Clark and Beckfield’s 
(2009) world system classification in order to determine which nation belongs to which 
of the three world system categories. As a result, the analyses presented below rely on the 
 65 
nation-state classifications presented by Clark and Beckfield (2009). Clark and Beckfield 
(2009) use the International Monetary Fund’s database (2004), ‘Direction of Trade 
Statistics’, in order to create a trichotomous world system indicator that is based on trade 
flow centrality. All nations with $1 million dollars or more in imports were included in 
their construction of a trichotomous world system structure. They then assigned each 
included nation a proportional measure of ‘coreness’, which is derived from each nation’s 
international trade connection density in the world system, using UNICET 6. Finally, 
they organize the nations into a three-block structure where ‘coreness’ is made to 
resemble theoretical expectations of world systems analysis as much as possible. Thus, 
core nations are those which maximize the intra-block density of the core category, 
bringing it as close to one as possible and signifying that these countries share near 
perfectly complete trade connections with one another. Semi-periphery nations are those 
which bring the intra-category block density as close as possible to the global median of 
trade network density. Periphery nations are those that bring the intra-block density as 
close as possible to 0, signifying that there are no trade connections between the nations 
that compose this category. Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) analysis includes 116 nations in 
its analysis that are also present in Snyder and Kick’s (1979) world system position 
classification. Of these 116 nations there are 91 for which data for the dependent variable 
is available through the world development indicators database. Thus, our models are 
limited to the yearly observations that exist within these 91 nations2. Descriptive statistics 
                                                 
2 In an alternate model Snyder and Kick’s (1979) trade based trichotomous world system 
position measure was used in order to identify core, periphery and semi-periphery 
nations. Findings from the alternative model varied from, but were supportive of, those 
reported here. Notably, the alternative model suggested that both periphery and semi-
periphery nation’s had a relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and growth in 
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concerning Clark and Beckfield’s world system position measure can be found in table 2. 
A list of all nations included in analyses using the Clark and Beckfield (2009), or the 
Snyder and Kick (1979) measure of world system position can be found in table 3 
We acknowledge that the models presented here rest on the assumption that the 
global world system is relatively stable/ time invariant within the time period examined 
in the present study. Here, we highlight that our argument is not that world system 
position is time invariant, but rather that world system position in the years immediately 
following the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions plays an important role in 
determining how a nation’s economic activity will affect carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita in the period being examined.  Despite this, we also include several alternative 
analyses in order to demonstrate that temporal variance of world system position within 
the period examined is not biasing our results. Thus, we include an alternative model, 
wherein we limit our analysis to years preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union. We 
conceptualize this as one appropriate check for the fixity of world system position, as it 
offers one of the best opportunities to observe a potential ‘shake-up’ of the global 
                                                 
GDP per capita that was significantly different than such a relationship in core countries. 
More importantly for the purposes of the present study, while core nations have a strong 
attenuation in CO2 emissions per capita at higher levels of GDP per capita, semi-
periphery nations demonstrated a much smaller attenuation of emissions at higher levels 
of GDP per capita, and continued to increase within the range of observed values. 
Additionally, Periphery nations display a relationship between CO2 emissions per capita 
and growth in GDP per capita that begins to plateau at higher levels of GDP per capita, 
but also continues to increase within the range of observed values (See figure 3, and 
model 5 of table 5).  
 Sensitivity analyses were also performed in order to ensure that the placement of 
China, United Arab Emirates, or India into particular world system categories did not 
drastically change the results. Removal of these countries from the dataset did not 
produce notably different results in any of the models that were run. These models are 
available upon request. 
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political economy in the 51-year period examined here. Findings from this model were 
consistent with findings from similar models that incorporated all available years into the 
sample, and can be seen in model 6 of table 4. However, we note that this alternative 
model was only performed using the Snyder and Kick (1979) world system position 
indicator, as the models using Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) measure were unable to 
converge when using the truncated sample. As an additional check against model 
sensitivity to nations changing world system position, we run an analysis using Clark’s 
(2012) update of Clark and Beckfield’s world system position indicator in order to 
identify nations which have transitioned from one world system category to another, and 
exclude them from the analysis. Again, there were no substantial changes from the 
models presented in table 4. Results of this sensitivity analysis can be seen in model 7 of 
table 5. 
Percent of the population that resides in urban areas is also included in the models 
in order to account for intensity of land use and rates of consumption that can differ 
significantly between urban and rural settings. Additionally, previous research has 
established that urban population size is a significant driver of fossil fuel use and, as a 
result, CO2 emissions per capita (Clement 2010; Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw, & 
Jenkins 2002). Urban population percentage, as defined by the World Bank, measures the 
proportion of the total population living in areas that are defined as urban by a country’s 
national statistical offices. The calculation is made using total population estimates from 
the world development indicators database and the United Nations World Urbanization 
Prospects’ urban ratios statistic. 
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 As previous research has repeatedly found that the relationship between both 
GDP per capita, and the percent of Urban residents and CO2 emissions per capita is non-
monotonic, we include squared terms for both of these measures in the analysis in order 
to capture potential nonlinearity. 
Following York and colleagues (York, Rosa, & Dietz 2002; York et al. 2003a, 
2003b), we log all variables in the analysis in order to reflect the multiplicative and 
elastic relationship between anthropogenic drivers and carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita. The result of this is that all findings represent the proportional change in CO2 
emission per capita for every one-percent change in a given predictor variable. In order to 
make the fit of models comparable by way of likelihood ratio testing, all observations 
with missing data on any of the independent variables were dropped from the analysis.  
 
Table 2.1. Logged Level 1 (time variant) Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
CO2 Emissions Per 
Capita 
-14.476 -14.063 2.111448 -22.781 -10.83609 
GDP Per Capita 8.385 8.392 1.538 4.735 11.314 
Percent Urban 
Population 
3.978 4.151 0.507 1.388 4.588 
Level 1 observations: N=3556 
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Periphery 34 3572.61 61662.50 113.87 
Semi-Periphery  18 7507.357 81947.24 408.72 
Core 39 18105.05 67804.55 150.55 
Total 91 11241.67 81947.24 113.8766 
Note: The minimum core value of 150.55 is attributable to China in 1971; the maximum periphery 
value of 61,662.5 is attributable to Iceland in 2007; and the maximum semi-periphery value of 




Table 2.3. World System Measure Nation Classifications 
 Core Semi-periphery Periphery 









Hungary, India, Iran, 













Chile, Colombia, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Iraq, 
Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Libya, Nigeria, 
Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, 






Congo (Dem. Rep.), 
Congo (Rep.), Costa 
Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, 









South Africa, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, 
Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Vietnam, 
Yemen 
















India, Iran, Iraq, 
Ireland, Israel, Jordan, 





Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 




(Dem. Rep.), Congo 
(Rep.), Costa Rica, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Czech 
Republic, Dominican 






Libya, Malta, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, 




Sudan, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, 







All models included in the analysis are hierarchical linear models of CO2 
emissions per capita with yearly observations of variables nested within nations. We use 
a hierarchical linear modeling approach, as opposed to the fixed effects approach that has 
become more traditional in structural human ecology studies, for two reasons. First, 
hierarchical linear modeling provides more information concerning the structure of the 
variation in the outcome of interest than can be provided by fixed effects approaches. 
This is useful, in this case, because it enables us to determine whether or not the majority 
of variation in CO2 emissions per capita is explainable within nations (over time) or 
between nations. That is to say, by allowing for the calculation of a variance partition 
coefficient, a multi-level modeling approach allows one to determine whether variation in 
CO2 emissions per capita is more likely a function of time variant factors, such as GDP 
and urbanization, or differences in the relatively time invariant characteristics of nation 
states, such as world system position. Developing such an understanding is important if 
we hope to craft policies that are able to successfully mitigate negative environmental 
effects by reducing CO2 emissions.  
Second, multilevel, random coefficients modeling approaches weight the effect 
that groups have on global outcomes according to the number of observations that each 
group has relative to the total sample of observations. Thus, multilevel modeling 
generates results that are less likely to be skewed by unusual observations, even when 
working with smaller samples. Though this can be done using a fixed effects modeling 
approach, such weighting is inherent in the random coefficients model as a result of the 
way that standard errors are calculated. Consequently, HLM is a more parsimonious way 
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of weighting panels in order to ensure findings are well estimated. Panel weights within 
random coefficients models are calculated as follows: 
𝛽0𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝛽0𝑖
∗ + (1 − 𝑤𝑖)𝛽0 
 
Where 𝛽0𝑖 is the weighted nation specific mean of CO2 emissions per capita included in 
the random coefficients model; 𝑤𝑖  is the weight, which is calculated as a ratio of the 
between nation variance divided by total variance; 𝛽0𝑖
∗  is the unweighted nation-specific 
mean of CO2 emissions per capita; and 𝛽0 is the grand mean of CO2 emissions per capita 
within the model. 
 The logic of our modeling approach is as follows: the null model is a random 
intercept model and provides a basic understanding of whether most of the variation in 
CO2 emission per capita appears to be explainable by differences in time variant factors 
(level 1) or relatively time invariant nation state characteristics (level 2). Specifically, the 
null model allows for a straightforward calculation of the variance partition coefficient.  
Model 1, similar to the null model, is a random intercept model. However, model 1 also 
includes level 1 fixed effect predictor variables. Comparison between the null model and 
model 1 will help to interpret whether or not the inclusion of these common predictors 
appear to change the level that the majority of the variation in CO2 emissions per capita is 
attributable to in any meaningful way. Model 2 complicates model 1 by including the 
level 2 fixed effects predictors of world system position. Using a likelihood ratio test 
enables us to conclude whether or not including level two variables is a meaningful 
improvement in model fit relative to model 1, which only includes level 1 (time variant) 
variables. Model 3 is a random coefficients model, and serves to test whether or not there 
is any meaningful interaction between the level 2 variables of world system position, and 
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the level 1 variable GDP per capita, while also holding the covariance of the intercept and 
slope of GDP per capita relative to CO2 emissions per capita equal to 0. Further, model 3 
allows the relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita to vary 
randomly, or, in other words, for the model to account for this relationship within each 
individual nation, while also continuing to investigate the broader trend at the cross-
national level. Finally, model 4 replicates the logic of model 3, however, this model 
allows covariance to be unstructured. Thus, model 4 serves to test whether or not there is 
a tendency for nations relationships between GDP per capita and CO2 per capita to 
become more or less similar as GDP per capita increases, as well as examining the form 
and strength of relationships between all other predictors and CO2 emissions per capita. 
 The general structure of the random coefficients model with unstructured 
covariance and all fixed and random effects variables included is as follows: 
Micro Model- CO2it = 𝛽0𝑖(𝑥0𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽1𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
2) +
                                        𝛽12(𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽13(𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡
2 ) + 𝑒0𝑖𝑡 
 
Macro Model-  𝛽0𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑖)+𝛽4(𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽5(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) + 𝜇0𝑖  
   𝛽1𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽6(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑖)+𝛽7(𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽8(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) + 𝜇1𝑖 



















Level 1: e0it~N(0, 2e0) 
 
 Where CO2it represents the log of per capita carbon dioxide emissions of the ith nation in 
year t; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the logged value of nation i’s GDP per capita in time period t; 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
2  is the log of the quadratic term for country i in year t; 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the binary 
measurement of the periphery status of nation i;  𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑖  is the binary measurement of the 
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semi-periphery status of nation i; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the binary measurement of the core status of 
nation i; 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the log of the percent of the population living in urban areas in nation 
i during year t. 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡
2  is the quadratic term for the log of urban population percentage; 
𝑒0𝑖𝑡 is the residual difference in CO2 emissions per capita for the ith country in year t; 𝜇0𝑖 
is the residual differential CO2 emissions per capita value for country i when all predictor 
variables are held at 0; 𝜇1𝑖 is the residual difference in CO2 emissions per capita change 
for nation i for every additional 1 unit increase in GDP per capita; 𝜇2𝑖 is the residual 
difference in CO2 emissions per capita change for nation i for every additional 1 unit 
increase in GDP per capita squared; 𝜎𝑢0
2  represents the between nation variance in CO2 
emissions per capita (in models 3 and 4 this is only true at the intercept); 𝜎𝑢1
2  is the 
between nation variance in CO2 emissions per capita change for every 1 unit increase in 
GDP per capita; 𝜎𝑢2
2  is the between nation variance in CO2 emission per capita for every 
additional increase in GDP per capita squared; 𝜎𝑢0𝑢1
2  is the country level estimate of the 
covariance between nation’s value of CO2 emissions per capita at the intercept and their 
relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita; and 𝜎𝑢0𝑢2
2  is the 
country level estimate of the covariance between nation’s value of CO2 emissions per 
capita at the intercept and their relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and GDP 
per capita squared. 
Results 
Outcomes of random intercept and random coefficient models with structured and 
unstructured covariance analyses are reported in table 2. 
 Null model findings suggest that the vast majority of variation between the per 
capita emissions is explainable by relatively time invariant, national level characteristics, 
 75 
rather than changes within nations across time periods. Specifically, the VPC of the 





2 ), indicating that 91.7% of 
variation is explainable at the country level. These findings tentatively indicate that it is 
proper to conceptualize the drivers of differences in CO2 emissions as being largely 
related to time invariant characteristics that are nation specific. 
 The findings reported in model 1 and model 2 largely support the results found in 
the null model, demonstrating that the inclusion of time variant predictors and country 
specific variables still renders roughly 88% of the total variation in CO2 emissions 
explainable by level 2, time invariant, nation state factors. Additionally, findings here 
support previous research which suggests that GDP per capita, and urbanization are all 
significant drivers of CO2 emissions per capita. Examination of the decrease in country 
level variation between model 1 and model 2 indicates that roughly 3.5% of all variation 
in CO2 emissions per capita can be accounted for simply by including world system 









= 0.0346)3. We note that this finding 
suggests that there is a great deal of variation in CO2 emissions per capita to be accounted 
for outside of world system position. However, we also note that this is a non-trivial 
amount of variation in CO2 emissions per capita, and that such a finding highlights the 
importance of including factors related to the structure of the global political economy in 
                                                 
3 In an alternate model we use Snyder and Kick’s world system position measure and find 
that it accounts for roughly 5% of all variation in CO2 emissions per capita. Despite this, 
we focus our analysis here on models using Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) WSP measure 
because it is more recent, was generated in a more parsimonious manner, and has been 
shown to outperform Snyder and Kick’s WSP measure as a predictor of economic growth 
(Clark & Beckfield 2009). Findings from the alternate model are represented in Figure 3. 
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analyses concerned with the relationship between economic growth and CO2 emissions 
per capita.  
Both model 1 and 2 suggest that GDP per capita increases CO2 per capita 
drastically initially, with a slight attenuation of this increase being introduced at higher 
rates of GDP per capita. This relationship grants limited support to the notion that if 
nations increase wealth they might decrease environmental impacts. However, it is 
important to note that in both models the increase in CO2 emissions associated with the 
growth of GDP is so dramatic that the relatively small decline later on would likely not 
be adequate to significantly mitigate environmental impacts.  Likelihood ratio tests 
suggests that both models 1 and 2 fit the data better than the null model, but neither 
model 2 or model 1 provide improvements in model fit relative to one another. 
 Models 3 uses a random coefficients approach in order to compare the effect of 
GDP per capita on CO2 emissions within nations of periphery and semi-periphery world 
systems categories to the effect within core countries. Model 4 serves the same purpose 
as model 3, however, contrary to previous models, model 4 also allows for covariance to 
remain unstructured. Considering that likelihood ratio tests suggested that model 4 
provided a significant improvement in model fit over all other models, and that allowing 
for unstructured covariance provides more information, the following interpretation will 
focus on model 4. 
 Findings in model 4 suggest that core nations have both an environmental 
Kuznets curve and significantly lower CO2 emissions per capita than all other nations in 
the world system, all other factors held constant. Conversely, model 4 findings also 
suggest that semi-periphery nations, on average, are associated with a more than 34 
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percent increase in CO2 emissions per capita relative to all other nations. Further, unlike 
in previous models, allowing covariance to be unconstrained demonstrates that in semi-
periphery nations there is an inverse Kuznets curve, where the relationship between GDP 
per capita and CO2 emissions per capita is strongly negative initially, but as GDP per 
capita increases this negative effect is attenuated until at higher levels of GDP per capita 
the relationship between GDP per capita and emissions becomes positive. These findings 
support our hypotheses above, and are in line with world systems theory and the theory of 
unequal ecological exchange (Rice 2007), as such research suggests that semi-periphery 
nations are unable to mitigate negative environmental impacts even as they grow their 
economy due to the fact that, in many instances, these nations must grow their economy 
by producing goods for consumption in core nations with production techniques that are 
environmentally harmful, but affordable enough to make mass consumption of goods 
possible in the core. According to model 4, periphery nations are not significantly 
different from core nations in their relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 
emissions per capita. This finding, once again, is to be expected, as periphery nations 
have economies that often rely on the extraction of raw goods for export to producing 





Figure 2.1 Caption: Figure 1 represents findings outlined in model 4. Dashed, solid, and 
vertical dashed lines represent semi-periphery, core, and periphery nations, respectively. 
Note that, while semi-periphery and core nations have a similar relationship between 
GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita initially, they begin to diverge around 
$15,000 per capita. Beyond that point, semi-periphery nations’ emissions accelerate as 
GDP grows while core nations’ level of emissions begins to decrease. Though periphery 
nations were included for reference, we note that model 4 findings suggest that the 
relationship is not statistically significant. 
 
It is important to note that the covariance of the relationship between GDP per 
capita and CO2 emissions per capita is strongly negative, however, we find a small 
positive value for the covariance in the relationship between GDP per capita squared and 
CO2 emissions per capita which suggests that as GDP per capita increases nations will 
have increasingly similar levels of CO2 emissions per capita until higher values of GDP 
 79 
per capita are achieved, at which point nations begin to have increasingly dissimilar 
relationships between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita, as can be seen in 







Figure 2.2 Caption: Figure 2 represents model 4 covariance findings. Findings suggest 
that at low levels of GDP per capita nations have an increasingly similar relationship 
between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita, but as GDP per capita increases 
nations have increasingly different relationships between GDP per capita and CO2 
emissions per capita.  
 
 Here we highlight that the finding of the present study, particularly those of an 
inverse Kuznets curve in the semi-periphery, a high percentage of variation in emissions 
being attributable to time invariant factors, and a non-trivial percentage of emissions 
being accounted for by world systems position, offers a great deal of nuance to the 
current understanding of the EKC hypothesis, and challenges the assertion that all 
nations would see a reduction in CO2 emissions given a high enough level of economic 
development. To the contrary, the findings of the present study indicate that the 
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relationship between CO2 emissions and economic growth within nations is heavily 
influenced by the developmental pathway that is made available to them within their 




Table 2.4. Random Coefficients Models of Drivers of CO2 Emissions 
(All Variables are Logged) 
Variable Null Model Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Time (Level 1) Variables 
































Country (Level 2) Variables 
















Core WSP (Reference) – _ _ _ _ 
Cross-Level Interaction Variables 
Core x GDPPC 
(Reference) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
 
Core x GDPPC2 
(Reference) 




































Constant -14.537 -19.685 -19.395 -27.191 -38.630 
Variance Terms 
𝜎𝑒𝑜
2  (Year level) 0.3922 0.2255 0.2255 0.1394 0.1362 
𝜎𝑢𝑜
2  (Country level) 4.372 1.644 1.587 19.577 1067.782 
𝜎𝑢1
2  – – – 1.10e-12 49.829 
𝜎𝑢2
2  – – – .0048 .1422 
𝜎𝑢𝑜𝑢1
2  – – – 0 -228.7363 
𝜎𝑢𝑜𝑢2
2  – – – 0   12.003 
*** p<.001   ** p<.01       * p<.05 
Table 2.4. Random Coefficients Models of Drivers of CO2 Emissions. Includes 91 
nations for the years 1960-2011. All models include 3556 total observations that are 
separated into the 91 country clusters. The average cluster size is 39.1, the maximum 
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cluster size id 52 and the minimum cluster size is 1 (Jamaica is only included for a single 
year due to data limitations). 
   
Conclusion 
The results presented in this analysis offer new insights into the long standing 
debate over the relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation. 
The EKC is a useful descriptive empirical tool for understanding the dynamic processes 
of change between economic development and environmental impacts, however the lack 
of theoretical depth applied to conceptualizations of the EKC produces inaccurate 
interpretations of socio-environmental processes. There have been numerous insights 
developed in the field of environmental sociology that help to create a more accurate 
assessment of the variations in nation-state relations to environmental processes. In this 
analysis we draw on world systems theory analyses to identify distinct qualitative 
differences between nations that affect the empirical existence of an EKC cross-
nationally over time. We have chosen to rely upon World Systems theory in our study 
because it is a field that is widely recognized as having developed a sophisticated 
understanding of differences between nations-states based on a variety of factors related 
to the structure of the global political economy.  
We operationalize the classification of nations’ placement in the World System, 
and assess if these classifications are meaningful distinctions that affect the non-linear 
relationship between economic growth and environmental impacts. These distinctions are 
found to be statistically significant and demonstrate that different groups of nations have 
different non-linear relationships between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita. 
Specifically, while the EKC is found to exist in core countries, the opposite relationship 
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exists in countries the semi-periphery category of World System position. We note that, 
though the models used to assess the variation across world systems stratum treat world 
system position as temporally invariant, we conceptualize this as demonstrating that a 
nation’s position in the world system in the decades immediately following the institution 
of Bretton Woods establishment has had a lasting effect on how its economic activity 
affects the environment. However, to test for model sensitivity to world system position 
changes we also performed an alternate analysis on years prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union that yielded results that were consistent with those presented here, as well 
as an analysis in which all nations believed to have changed world system position (Clark 
2012) were dropped. In all analyses, our results remained consistent. Finally, we 
highlight that by using a multilevel random coefficients model we are able to demonstrate 
that most of the variation in CO2 emissions is due to time invariant nation state 
characteristics – in the case of this analysis we focus on one such characteristic, position 
in the capitalist world system in the period following World War Two. To this end, our 
model indicates that the effect of economic development on CO2 emissions is dependent 
on classifications that are less time variant, and we believe that in the future this approach 
can be built upon by including other time invariant predictors, such as the colonial history 
of a nation. In particular, we believe that including aspects of colonial history such as 
time spent under colonial rule, and the colonization tactics of the relevant regime will be 
helpful in such analyses. 
This finding offers new insights into the general assumptions made in EKC 
analyses, in that it demonstrates that economic development is not homogenous and the 
existence of an EKC is more dependent on categories of nations than it is on stages of 
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economic development. While these findings fit the assumptions and previous results of 
Ecological-Marxists assessments of similar patterns, they also offer a unique empirical 
conceptualization of the EKC. Our results demonstrate the need for EKC analyses to 
draw on existing theories when observing processes of environmental change, a practice 
that we hope future researchers interrogating this relationship will build upon as well. 
Having determined that global inequality among nations is indeed a critical aspect 
of anthropogenic climate change, and that historical, nation specific factors offer the 
potential to explain a staggering amount of this variation, in the chapter that follows I will 
explore these relationships from a slightly different perspective. Considering the 
importance of colonization to the establishment of inequality in the international 
economy, patterns of unequal exchange and uneven development, and both resource 
extraction and environmental pollution in the global South, in the next chapter I explore 






Figure 2.3 Caption: Figure 3 represents findings from alternate model (model 5) based on 
Snyder and Kick's (1979) world system position indicators. Dashed, dotted, and solid 
lines represent semi-periphery, periphery and core nations, respectively. Note that, while 
core nations show a decrease in emissions per capita at high levels of GDP per capita, 
semi-periphery nations continue to increase and periphery nations remain relatively flat, 





Table 2.5. Alternate Random Coefficients Models of Drivers of CO2 Emissions 
(All Variables are Logged) 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 

























Country (Level 2) Variables 












Core WSP (Reference) – – – 
Cross-Level Interaction Variables 
Core x GDPPC 
(Reference) 
_ _ _ 
Core x GDPPC2 
(Reference) 
_ _ _ 
























Constant -75.212 -57.196 -44.064 
Variance Terms 
𝜎𝑒𝑜
2  (Year level) 0.118 0.095 0.131 
𝜎𝑢𝑜
2  (Country level) 728.349 652.270 1295.487 
𝜎𝑢1
2  38.190 38.043 56.178 
𝜎𝑢2
2  0.115 0.129 0.151 
𝜎𝑢𝑜𝑢1
2  -165.757 -156.802 -267.395 
𝜎𝑢𝑜𝑢2
2  9.088 9.035 13.579 
Nations 91 85 2966 
Nation-Years 3556 1730 76 
*** p<.001   ** p<.01       * p<.05 
Table 4. Alternate Random Coefficients Models of Drivers of CO2 Emissions. Model 5 
results represent the WSP’s effect on the relationship between GDPPC and CO2 
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emissions per capita if the classic, Snyder and Kick (1979), measure of WSP is used, 
rather than Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) measure. Model 6 presents the results when 
using Snyder and Kick’s WSP measure and the analysis is limited to those years prior to 
1991. Model 7 displays results using Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) WSP measure, but 
leaving out those countries that were found to have changed world system position when 









LEGACIES OF POLLUTION: THE INTRODUCTION OF 
COLONIAL HISTORIES TO DISCUSSIONS OF EMISSIONS 
 
A research concern of increasing importance is that of the relationship between 
inequality, economic activity and environmental impact at both the national and 
international level (Brulle & Dunlap 2015; Jorgenson 2015; Jorgenson, Schor, & Huang 
2017).  Indeed, recognition of the pace with which anthropogenic climate change is 
proceeding has been spurred by increasing global temperatures, weather events and 
natural disasters that are unprecedented in both scale and regularity, and continuously 
rising sea levels (IPCC 2014). As CO2 emissions are recognized as one of the most 
important drivers of such change, special attention has been given by environmental 
social scientists to the socio-economic and political factors that are associated with such 
emissions. While such research has long focused on the relationship between economic 
activity and economic development, particularly as that relationship is modified by a 
number of relevant social factors (York, Dietz and Rosa 2003; York 2008; York 2012; 
Jorgenson and Clark 2012; Knight and Schor 2014; York and McGee 2017), recent 
developments in our understanding of the growing problem of economic and political 
inequality (Picketty 2014), as well as the recognition that such increases in inequality are 
often associated with economic growth( Picketty and Saez 2014), has led to inequality 
becoming one of the primary focuses in discussions of sustainable development (United 
Nations 2012; IPCC 2014).  
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As a result of these developments environmental sociology, in particular, has seen 
a call for an increased understanding of the complex ways in which national and global 
inequality interact with and modify the relationship between emissions and economic 
development (Ehrhardt-Martinez, Schor, Abrahamse, Alkon, Axsen, Brown, Shwom, 
Southerton, and Wilhite 2015; Carmin, Tierney, Chu, Hunter, Roberts, and Shi 2015). 
While a growing body of literature has taken on the task of understanding the role that 
inequality plays in impact using increasingly novel methods and data at the national level 
(Ravallion et al. 2000; Jorgenson et al. 2012; Jorgenson et al. 2015; Jorgenson et al. 
2016; Jorgenson et al. 2017; Knight et al. 2017; McGee and Greiner 2018), research 
concerning the ways in which international inequality modifies such relationships has 
remained focused on operationalizations of world systems theory (Burns, Davis, and 
Kick 1997; Roberts, Grimes, & Manale 2003; Prew 2015; Greiner and McGee 2018), or 
on the use of trade imbalances and foreign direct investment in the international economy 
(Jorgenson 2007; Rice 2007; Jorgenson 2012; Prell and Sun 2015).  The present study 
contributes to the existing literature on the effect of inequality in the international 
economy on emissions by exploring the ways in which a nation’s colonial history 
modifies its relationship between economic development and emissions.  
Using a random coefficients modeling approach and variance partition analysis, I 
examine how the time a nation spent under the rule of a colonial power affects the 
relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita, as well as how much 
of the variation in national level emissions per capita is explainable by the time spent 
under colonial rule. Such an analysis provides a deeper insight into how international 
inequalities engendered by historical patterns of colonization meaningfully influence the 
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ways that economic activity impacts environmental quality today. Additionally, I argue 
that determining the proportion of the variation in emissions that is accounted for by the 
amount of time a nation was colonized further clarifies the extent to which international 
patterns of unequal ecological exchange are a legacy of colonization that offer ongoing 
benefits to territories that colonized nations around the world, while hindering nations 
that were colonized as they attempt to achieve sustainability. 
In order to properly understand the findings of the research presented here, I draw 
upon a number of theoretical traditions in the fields of environmental sociology and 
political economy. From environmental sociology I rely upon work in the tradition of 
environmental world systems, structural human ecology, and unequal ecological 
exchange theory to better understand how it is that international inequality often provides 
environmental advantages to some nations at the expense of others. Within political 
economy I draw heavily upon the work of those in the world systems and dependency 
theory traditions, as well as Marx, and W.E.B Dubois to explore the ways in which 
colonial relations of the past have been transformed into geopolitical advantages in the 
present. In doing so I will demonstrate that taking colonial legacies into account can 
present a relatively powerful and straightforward way to understand differences in the 
way that economic activity seems to relate to environmental impact in nations of the 
global South and global North. Finally, by employing a variance partition analysis I will 
demonstrate that, broadly speaking, mitigating cross-national inequality by providing a 
redress to the legacies of colonialism offers a path to reducing emissions that is just as 






Work concerning the effects of international inequalities and environmental 
impact has taken a variety of approaches over the last several decades, the most common 
of which, environmental world systems and unequal ecological exchange, shall be 
reviewed here. Attempts to develop frameworks which could both further our 
understanding of anthropogenic drivers of environmental degradation and while still 
considering the historical development of international inequalities in the global economy 
drew simultaneously from Impact literatures (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1972; Commoner, 
1972), Dependency theory (Frank 1967), Unequal Exchange (Emmanuel 1972a), and 
World Systems theory (Wallerstein 1974). In doing so, such work paid particular 
attention to how the underdevelopment of economies within the global South would be 
oriented to extraction of natural resources and hyper-exploited labor, as well as 
environmentally intensive production. In what follows, I will briefly review the origins of 
this work. In doing so I will attempt to highlight the foundations of contemporary 
international inequality in colonial relations, as well as the import of considering such 
historical interactions when attempting to understand patterns of environmental impact. 
Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century work in the field of 
political economy and development theory responded to the widely held international 
economic theory of comparative advantage, which claimed that a nation’s role and 
position in international exchange regimes was, simply put, determined by its ability to 
produce and export a particular product cheaper than any other nation (Ricardo 1817; 
Mill 1821; Magee 1980). As a result of this process, according to adherents of this theory, 
all nations would be able to get all goods for the lowest possible cost, allowing all 
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countries equal opportunity to thrive. It was largely from responses to this theory, ones 
which attempted to understand how the mechanisms underlying international trade served 
to transfer wealth, in the form of surplus value, from less powerful nations (typically 
those within the global South) to more powerful ones (e.g. nations in the global North), 
that much of the contemporary understanding of inequality in the international economy 
was derived. In the broadest sense, it can be said that the critiques of development theory 
and comparative advantage in this period developed into three distinct, yet interrelated 
traditions: Dependency theory (Frank 1967), Unequal Exchange (Emmanuel 1972a), and 
World Systems theory (Wallerstein 1974).  
Here, I highlight that these three academic traditions attend to the development of 
a hierarchical international system of exchange, wherein historical interactions of 
colonialism and imperialism have led to a subset of nation-states being placed in an 
advantageous position in relations of exchange and production in relation to others. For 
example, unequal exchange theory (Emmanuel 1972a; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; 
Jorgenson 2009) has noted that wages in the global South have been artificially restrained 
via the use of military force, and, more recently, political and economic pressures from 
international bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 
form of Structural Adjustment Policies (Harvey 2003; 2005). Through this wage 
suppression, nations of the global North are able to extract surplus value from nations of 
the global South in the international marketplace, as the wages of consumers in the global 
North allow products to be sold for a much greater price than they could be otherwise, 
even as the share of variable capital involved in the production process is kept at a 
minimum (Emmanuel 1972a). Similarly, dependency theory (Frank 1967) argues that the 
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ability of certain nation states to control networks of trade relations through military and 
political pressure places them in a position of power in negotiations with other nation 
states. By leveraging this power these nations are able to dictate many of the terms of 
production in other nations in order to make them more favorable for the multinational 
corporations whose economic interests are viewed as most closely aligned with their own 
(Pomerantz 2000). Often, if not always, such relationships hinder the development of the 
disadvantaged nations, leading them to invest in infrastructures and technologies that 
make it ever more difficult for them to seek alternative, more beneficial, trade relations 
(Chase-Dunn 1998). Thus, this form of path dependency has been termed “the 
development of underdevelopment” (Frank 1967).  
Finally, world systems theory, as it was developed by Wallerstein (1974), argued 
that there was a more or less formal hierarchy of nation-state groups: the core, semi-
periphery and periphery. Placement of these nations into their respective groupings 
determined their ability to exploit other nations in international trade, or, alternatively, 
the likelihood that they would be exploited. Thus, according to this schema, core nations 
were able to mobilize political and military advantages in the world system in order to 
manipulate the development process of nations in the semi-periphery and periphery, 
thereby rendering such nations vulnerable to exploitation via trade. Here, semi-periphery 
nations are distinct from nations in the periphery and the core in that, even as they are 
exploited by the core, they are able to exploit the periphery. Wallerstein notes that it was 
during the expansion and relative solidification of the modern world system that nations 
fell into their respective roles of core, semi-periphery, and periphery nations. 
Specifically, drawing from Marx (1976), Lenin (1999), and Luxembourg (2004) 
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Wallerstein (2007) notes that it was the need to incorporate additional sources of labor 
and resources into the international capitalist economy that led more established capitalist 
nation states to seek out and colonize other territories. In doing so, colonial powers 
established colonies, and ensured that “the colonial state was the weakest in the interstate 
system, with the lowest degree of autonomy, and therefore maximally subject to 
exploitation by firms and persons from a different country, the so-called metropolitan 
country” (Wallerstein 2007, p 56). 
While work in these literatures were incredibly beneficial to developing a greater 
understanding of international trade, development, and inequality, such traditions largely 
ignored how these relations might affect the way that nations development processes 
impact environmental goods and resources. In particular, while Marx himself was 
concerned with the socio-environmental relations that international patterns of capital 
accumulation brought about (Foster 1999; Foster, Clark and York 2010), it was not until 
the development of the new ecological paradigm (NEP) (Catton and Dunlap 1978a; 
1978b) that considerations of the environment began to be taken seriously within 
sociology and development theory. However, following the identification of human 
exceptionalism within much of sociology, work concerning the relationship between 
development, international inequality, and environmental impact began to develop 
rapidly. 
One of the first works in this tradition was Bunker’s (1984) classic piece 
concerning unequal ecological exchange and modes of extraction. Bunker contended that 
a critical, and all too often overlooked aspect of development theories was the limitation 
that the orientation of technologies, infrastructures, and labor toward the extraction of 
 96 
resources and energy by colonial powers placed on the development opportunities of 
nations in the global South. As Bunker noted, a strict reliance on the labor theory of value 
(Marx 1976) in order to determine the extent of exploitation that occurred through 
international exchange was ecologically naïve1. In particular, Bunker noted that, while 
the infrastructure and populations that developed around productive economic activities 
tended to contribute to later development– assuming of course that outmoded 
technologies and infrastructures where able to be replaced by newer ones, which they 
often are not in the periphery and semi-periphery of the capitalist world system (Bond 
and Downey 2012)– organizing populations, technologies and infrastructures around 
extractive activities tends to reduce opportunities for future development, as the resource 
they are in place to extract is diminished with time. Importantly, this implied that it is 
only with an appreciation for the historical legacy of a nation’s economic development 
that its current patterns of development, and in particular the relationship between its 
economic development and environmental health, could be properly understood. The 
introduction of colonial relations to many territories in the global South “established a 
locally dominant class which created a mode of extraction and so exploited both labor 
and nature that neither could reproduce itself as rapidly as it was being appropriated… 
the rates of exchange for the resulting exports were so unequal that the cycles of 
extraction and trade ultimately impoverished not only the physical and human 
environments but also the dominant classes that depended on them” (Bunker 1984, p. 
1024). 
                                                 
1 Bunker (2007) later acknowledged that Marx had indeed reckoned with many of these principles in the 
course of discussing capitalism’s rift with the natural metabolic processes of the earth (Foster 1999), and 
that a failure to incorporated ecological factors into understandings of unequal exchange was not, per se, a 
failure of the Marxist framework, but rather an under interrogated arena of development theory. 
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Lenski and Nolan (1984; 1985) sought to explore the importance of historical 
activities to contemporary patterns of development from an ecological-evolutionary 
theory perspective. Their analysis explored whether nations of the global South had 
greater economic success in the contemporary era (e.g. the 1970s and 1980s) if they had 
adopted plow or hoe/digging stick agricultural traditions. Recognizing critiques of 
ecological evolutionary theory as technologically determinist and naïve with respect to 
international power relations, Lenksi and Nolan explored the effect of agricultural 
technology in light of both world system position and colonial legacies. However, due to 
data limitations at the time, they were only able to measure such factors indirectly 
(Ziltener, Kunzler, and Walter 2017). Thus, colonial legacy was incorporated into Lenski 
& Nolan’s analysis by limiting the exploration of the relationship between premodern 
agricultural tradition and contemporary development to nations that had attained 
independence from colonial powers following 1940. While such a procedure is 
reasonable, as the task of Lenski and Nolan was to determine the effectiveness of 
agricultural tradition as a predictor of developmental success among nations that had 
been colonized, their analysis failed to consider how difference in colonial legacy might 
itself serve as a predictor of contemporary patterns of development. 
Further consideration of the effect that historical and contemporary international 
inequality has on the relationship between economic and social development patterns and 
environmental impact during this period was derived from developments within the 
impact literature. The most famous formulation of environmental impact, IPAT (Impact= 
Population*Affluence*Technology) (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1972; Commoner, 1972) was, 
itself steeped in controversy regarding the importance of inequality in the formulation. 
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With Ehrlich (1971) and colleagues taking the stance that the most notable anthropogenic 
driver of environmental degradation was population, while Commoner (1971) highlighted 
the fact that population was only truly meaningful in the context of affluence and 
technology2. It was with an eye towards these debates that the subsequently developed 
STIRPAT (Dietz and Rosa 1997) (stochastic impact by regression on population, 
affluence, and technology) formulation was created. 
From its inception, STIRPAT analysis was enmeshed in the debate over the 
existence of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Grossman and Krueger 1991; 
Panayotou 1992). The debate over the EKC can perhaps best be understood as a debate 
over the role of economic development in the STIRPAT formulation. Namely, 
proponents of the EKC argue that given sufficient economic development, further 
economic growth will reduce anthropogenic environmental impact (Dinda 2004). 
However, scholars within Marxian (Lynch 2016), environmental world systems (Roberts 
and Grimes 1997; Roberts, Grimes and Manale 2003; Prew 2015; Greiner and McGee 
2018) and unequal ecological exchange traditions (Jorgenson 2006; Jorgesnon & Clark 
2009) argue that the observation of an EKC is not evidence of nations developing in ways 
that reduce the relationship between affluence and the environment. Rather it is the result 
of wealthy, militarily powerful nations becoming more environmentally benign, while 
nations belonging to the global South tend to worsen with respect to this relationship. For 
example, Roberts and Grimes (1997) and Greiner and McGee (2018) have demonstrated 
that belonging to a particular stratum of the world system tends to predict the relationship 
                                                 
2 Importantly, Ehrlich later came to acknowledge that inequality is a critical factor driving anthropogenic 
impact: “population growth, along with overconsumption per capita, is driving civilization over the edge: 
billions of people are now hungry or micronutrient malnourished, and climate disruption is killing people” 
(Carrington 2018) 
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between economic development and CO2 emissions within a nation, and, further, that it is 
only in nations of the global core that anything resembling an EKC is observed. 
Lynch (2016) in an insightful theoretical critique of the EKC notes that many of 
the patterns of the EKC literature can be explained through a Marxist understanding of 
the global production chain. Following the logic of Emmanuel (1972), Lynch observes 
that the globally mobile nature of capital will result in the placement of new production 
facilities in locations where the costs of labor and environmental resources are lowest. In 
doing so capital creates a situation where the potential for surplus value creation is 
greatest and the requirements for investment are lowest, providing an opportunity to 
minimize both the variable and fixed components of capital. This link between the EKC 
and the reduction of the forms of capital is important, since, as noted above, to a great 
degree it is colonial legacies that are responsible for the suppression of wages and the 
ongoing exploitation of environmental resources in the global South. 
Though it is empirically beyond the scope of the analyses presented here, 
theoretically it is important to note that, to no small degree, Marxist analyses have 
revealed that consideration of the legacy of colonialism and imperialism is not only 
foundational to understanding the impact, development, inequality relation, but is 
fundamental to understanding the function of capital itself. According to Marx,  
“the treatment of the indigenous population was, of course, at its 
most frightful in plantation colonies set up exclusively for export 
trade, such as the West Indies, and in rich and populated countries, 
such as Mexico and India, that were given over to plunder…The 
colonies provided a market for the budding manufactures, and a 
vast increase in accumulation which was guaranteed by monopoly 
of the market… the treasures captured outside Europe by 
undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the 




Thus, the foundations for contemporary capitalism rest in primitive accumulation via 
dispossession, and the establishment of markets for the production and export of 
inexpensive goods and resources from colonies to imperial centers.  
Further, the foundations of the modern global economy, and the socio-
environmental relations that define it, in the colonial expansion of marketplaces was not a 
matter of historical happenstance. Such processes of ongoing expropriation are necessary 
if processes of accumulation are to proceed. Thus, to theoretically relegate the act of 
expropriation to a ‘primary’ moment which predates the development of the modern 
world system is to ignore the unique access the nations of the global North have had, and 
continue to have, to international pools of resources and labor in the course of their 
development (Pomerantz 2000; Fraser 2016).  
 “Since capitalist production can only fully develop with complete 
access to all territories and climes, it can no more confine itself to 
the natural resources and productive forces of the temperate zone 
than it can manage with white labour alone. Capital needs other 
races to exploit territories where the white man cannot work. It 
must be able to mobilise world labour power without restriction in 
order to utilise all productive forces of the globe—up to the limits 
imposed by a system of producing surplus value” (Luxemburg, 
2004, pp. 342-343). 
 
Luxembourg’s (2004) insight into the necessity of the expansion of capital in the colonial 
era belies an important truth of capital, that was only fleshed out by Du Bois (1920) some 
years later. Inequality is not only necessary to the origins, function, and expansion of 
capital, as others have noted (Emmanuel 1972a; Amin 1974; 2013; Pomerantz 2000), but 
from the inception of the socio-metabolic formation of capital, inequality– both 
nationally and internationally– has been operationalized racially. The project of 
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accumulation through colonization, as well as the maintenance of international inequality 
and environmental exploitation through military power and the use of supranational 
institutions (Downey 2015), has served to intertwine the progress of capital and the 
establishment of a racial hierarchy on a global scale. The project of imperialism created 
an ongoing opportunity for “exploitation on an immense scale for inordinate profit, not 
just to the very rich, but to the middle class and to the laborers. This chance lies in the 
exploitation of darker peoples…in these dark lands ‘industrial development’ may repeat 
in exaggerated form every horror of the industrial history of Europe, from slavery and 
rape to disease and maiming, with only one test of success- dividends!” (Du Bois 1920, p 
55). 
 Indeed, racial capitalism (Robinson 2000), takes as its central argument the Du 
Boisian notion that racism was one of the foundational logics underlying the 
establishment and expansion of capital (Dawson 2016; Fraser 2016). What’s more racial 
capitalism calls on theoretical and empirical work to reckon with the implications of 
applying a logic of historical materialism to modern inequalities, noting that much of the 
contemporary phenomena that we hope to understand can only be grappled with by 
applying “greater attention to the processes that shaped the modern world, such as 
colonization, primitive accumulation, slavery, and imperialism” (Pulido 2017, pp. 3-4).  
Hypotheses 
 
 Understanding the importance of colonial legacies to outcomes of environmental 
impact and national development, here I put forth a number of hypotheses. First, I 
hypothesize that the time a nation spent under colonial rule will be a significant predictor 
of the relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita. Specifically, I 
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argue nations that were colonized for longer periods of time will have been subjected to 
greater levels of underdevelopment, resulting in the establishment of labor practices, 
environmental resource extraction and protection practices, and infrastructural 
development patterns that result in an increasingly positive relationship between 
economic development and emissions. Second, following Greiner and McGee, I 
hypothesize that the majority of the variation in CO2 emissions per capita will be 
explainable by across unit (e.g. country level) factors. 
Data 
 
Data for the present study was gather from a number of sources. As with the 
studies presented in the previous chapters data for year level variables on nation-state 
factors such as GDP per capita, CO2 emissions per capita, urbanization, and the age 
structure of the population were gathered from the World Bank’s (2015), World 
Development Indicators database. Data concerning the length of time that a nation was 
colonized for were drawn from The University of Zurich’s Colonial Transformation 
Dataset (Ziltener, Kunzler, and Walter 2017) as well as Wimmer and Min’s (2006) 
dataset concerning a territory’s political and economic development, both before and 
after gaining independence. 
The dependent variable in the current study is CO2 emissions per capita from the 
burning of fossil fuels and the production of cement, measured in metric tons. The 
primary independent variables of interest are GDP per capita and the length of time spent 
under the rule of a colonial power. GDP per capita is measured in 2010 constant U.S. 
dollars, in order to account for well-established nonlinearity in the relationship between 
GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita GDP per capita2 is also included in every 
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model except the Null Model. In addition to GDP per capita, all models except the Null 
Model include controls for the percent of the population living in Urban settlements, 
including a square term allowing urbanization to effect emissions non-linearly, and the 
proportion of the population that is of economically productive age (15-64 years old). 
Each of these variables has been found to be an important driver of CO2 emissions in 
structural human ecology analyses (York et. al 2003; Liddle 2014). Descriptive statistics 
for level 1 variables can be viewed in Table 1. 
Data regarding the length of time that a nation was colonized for were gathered 
from Colonial Transformation Dataset (Ziltener, Kunzler, and Walter 2017) and Wimmer 
and Min’s (2006) dataset concerning the territory’s political and economic development. 
The University of Zurich’s Colonial Transformation Dataset provides information on the 
“impact of colonialism with 15 indicators” for the nations of Africa and Asia. Thus, the 
Colonial Transformation Dataset (Ziltener, Kunzler, and Walter 2017) was used to 
determine the length of time that a nation was colonized for in the continents of Asia and 
Africa, while Wimmer and Min’s (2006) dataset was used to determine the length of time 
involved with colonial powers for nations outside of these continents. Importantly, while 
the data provided by Wimmer and Min (2006) provides information on a broad number 
of territories. Using Wimmer and Min’s variable on the number of years that a nation was 
under the rule of an imperial power (“implag”) I was able to code the time of colonization 
for a substantially larger number of nations. I have chosen to end observation for the 
length of colonization variable in the year 1960 in order to accommodate the assumption 
of this study that historical legacies of colonialism influence variables of interest in the 
contemporary era. Thus, ending the length of colonization variable in the year 1960 
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allows me to explore how the colonial legacy of a nation prior to 1960 moderates the 
relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita in the years 1960 to 
2013. It is important to note that, as this study is meant to capture the effect of a nation 
being subject to the rule of a foreign power, here I do not consider nations that seceded 
from others via civil war, or otherwise, to have been under the rule of colonial powers. 
Thus, for example, Germany is not considered to have been colonized by Austria, and– 
though in many ways they undoubtedly share the characteristics of colonized states– 
nations of the former USSR are not considered to have been colonized either. 
Additionally, following the work of Emmanuel (1972b), I do not consider settler colonial 
states, such as the United States, Australia, and Canada, to have been colonized, as the 
unique circumstances of these nations typically led them to benefit from colonial 
processes, rather than being hindered by them3. Such a decision is also in line with work 
concerning colonization and racial capitalism (Robinson 2000), where it is noted that 
colonization can best be understood as a process through which an international 
racialized hierarchy was established that allowed for the ongoing accumulation of capital 
in nations of the global North. 
In the interest of making the results presented here easily comparable with other 
work done in the world systems and environmental world systems traditions (Clark and 
Beckfield 2009; Clark 2012; Greiner and McGee 2018), the length of colonization 
                                                 
3 In some instances, nations which were classified as colonized might be considered problematic. For 
example, China and Japan were never colonized, per se, but were exposed to unequal treaty agreements by 
colonial powers. Additionally, South Africa, though fitting the criteria of a settler colonial state in many 
ways, is included as a colonized nation due to the fact that for much of its history its political apparatus was 
controlled by an ethnic minority. In order to ensure that the inclusion of such nations was not skewing the 
results presented here, alternative models were run, where such cases were excluded. As there were no 
notable differences in the results those models are not presented here, though they are available upon 
request. 
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variable is constructed as a trichotomous indicator variable. Where nations have been 
placed into the categories of never colonized, colonized between 1 and 75 years, and 
colonized 76 years or more, where  years is the 75th percentile of time spent under 
colonial rule, and 1 year is the 50th percentile. Descriptive statistics for GDP per capita 
and CO2 emissions per capita conditioned upon the length of time that a nation was 
colonized for can be seen in Table 2. The list of nation’s that fall within each length of 
colonization category can be found in Table 3, while Figure 1 displays a map depicting 
which nations belong to which length of colonization categories. 
 As is common with quantitative analyses in the STRIPAT and structural human 
ecology tradition, all variables in the study except for indicator variables were natural log 
transformed, making the coefficients presented in the models below elasticities. The 
result of this is that all coefficients below represent the percent change in CO2 per capita 




Table 3.1. Level 1 (time variant) Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
CO2 Emissions Per 
Capita 
4.115 1.538 6.262 0.008 67.452 
GDP Per Capita 9,741 3,146 14,825 115 115,003 
Percent Urban 
Population 
3.735 3.870 0.648 0.767 4.605 
Age Dependency 0.368 0.312 0.297 -0.190 1.812 


















Colonized 1 to 75 Years 
 
 
Colonized 76 Years or More 
Mean GDP Per 
Capita 
23,041 5,722 5,236 
Maximum GDP 
Per Capita 
110,001 74,449 115,003 
Minimum GDP 
Per Capita 
365 105 115 
Mean CO2 Per 
Capita(t) 
8.145 3.230 2.679 
Maximum CO2 
Per Capita(t) 
40.590 67.452 63.743 
Minimum CO2 
Per Capita(t) 
0.294 0.009 0.008 
Groups 
(Countries) 
54 24 105 
Note: The maximum GDP value for nations colonized 76 years or more is attributable to the United Arab 
Emirates in the year 1980. The maximum GDP value for nations colonized 1 to 75 years is attributable to Qatar in 





Table 3.3 Length of Colonization Categories 
Never Colonized/Settler State Colonized up to 75 Years Colonized 76 Years or More 
Albania, Armenia, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macao SAR- 
China, Macedonia- FYR, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tonga, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, 
Uzbekistan 
 
Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
Japan, Jordan, Korea- Rep., 
Kuwait, Lao PDR, 
Madagascar, Maldives, 
Morocco, Niger, Qatar, 
Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Uganda, West Bank 
and Gaza, Zambia  
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, The 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cabo 
Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Republic of Congo, 
Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, 
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hong Kong SAR- 
China, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Micronesia, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Solomon Islands, South Africa, 
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, 
















As was the case in the previous chapters, all models included in the present 
analysis are hierarchical linear models. The models presented below are structured such 
that years are nested within nation-state groupings. While there are various other 
alternatives to modeling the present analyses that could have been employed, such as 
panel regressions with fixed effects estimators for both country and year, employing a 
hierarchical linear model allows for country and year specific factors to be controlled for, 
but also provides the opportunity to perform a variance partition analysis. With respect to 
the present research, developing a better understanding of the variance partition is 
critical, as it allows for one to determine the importance of various factors in the model to 
understanding changes in CO2 emissions. Thus, by performing a random coefficients 
model I am able to explore the extent to which historical colonization plays a role in the 
current relationship between emissions per capita and GDP per capita. 
The models presented below have been designed in order to examine the effects 
of drivers of CO2 emissions per capita that are understood to be of theoretical and 
empirical import, while also accounting for the effect of historical legacies of colonialism 
on the relationship between GDP per capita, perhaps the most well studied of all drivers 
of anthropogenic emissions, and CO2 emissions per capita. Considering this, the null 
model is included as a means to interrogate the distribution of the variance in CO2 
emissions per capita between level 1, or those factors which vary year to year, and level 
2, those factors which vary across nations and are more historical in nature. Model 1 
includes variables which are commonly understood to be drivers of CO2 emissions per 
capita in structural human ecology, such as GDP per capita, urbanization, and the age 
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structure of a population. In doing so, model 1 allows us to explore the proportion of the 
total variation in emissions that is explainable by such factors. Model 2 builds upon 
model 1 by including the indicator variables for the length of time that a nation spent 
under the rule of a colonial power. As with Model 1, including the length of colonization 
variables in model 2 allows for the proportion of variance that is explainable by such 
factors to be discovered while also controlling for all other measurable and theoretically 
relevant variables. The Null Model, and Models 1 and 2 are random intercepts models 
with structured covariance, which is necessary in order to be able to meaningfully explore 
variance partition coefficients. Unlike the Null Model, Model 1, and Model 2,  
Model 3 is intended to explore the moderating effect that the length of time a 
nation was colonized for has on the relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 
emissions per capita. Exploring the moderating effect that the length of time spent under 
the rule of a colonial power has on this relationship requires an interaction between a 
level two variable, length of time under colonial rule, and a level one variable, GDP per 
capita. Such an interaction necessitates that the variance covariance matrix be 
unstructured. While unstructured covariance greatly increases the complexity of the 
model, and thus also increases the difficulty involved in interpreting the model, it 
provides another opportunity for additional analysis as well. In particular, the use of an 
unstructured covariance matrix allows for exploration into whether or not there is a 
tendency for nations’ relationships between GDP per capita and CO2 per capita to 
become more, or less, similar as GDP per capita increases. Such an analysis is greatly 
important to the study at hand, as it allows for an empirical investigation of the validity of 
the modernization development hypotheses that many contemporary sustainable 
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development goals and plans rest upon. Namely, it allows for a test of the validity of the 
claim that as nation’s grow their economies they will become more, and not less, alike in 
their ability and desire to protect the environment from anthropogenic degradation. 
Finally, it is important to note that the nature of the processes that underlie GDP per 
capita and CO2 emissions per capita is such that the value of these variables in each year 
is typically highly correlated to years immediately following and preceding them. This 
implicit correlation can potentially bias standard errors, leading to overconfidence in 
estimates and the erroneous appearance of statistical significance. In order to address this 
issue, model 3 corrects for autoregressive 1 disturbances, correcting for heteroskedastic 
and contemporaneously correlated residuals (Beck and Katz 1995). 
 The general structure of the random coefficients model with unstructured 
covariance and all fixed and random effects variables included is as follows: 
 
Micro Model- CO2it = 𝛽0𝑖(𝑥0𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽1𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
2) +
                                        𝛽12(𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽13(𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡
2 ) + 𝛽14(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒0𝑖𝑡 
 
Macro Model-  𝛽0𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑜𝑙1𝑇𝑜75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖)+𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑙 > 75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖) +
𝛽5(𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖) + 𝜇0𝑖 
   𝛽1𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑜𝑙1𝑇𝑜75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖)+𝛽7(𝐶𝑜𝑙 > 75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖) +
𝛽8(𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖) + 𝜇1𝑖 
   𝛽2𝑖 =  𝛽2 + 𝛽9(𝐶𝑜𝑙1𝑇𝑜75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖)+𝛽10(𝐶𝑜𝑙 > 75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖) +



















Level 1: e0it~N(0, 2e0) 
 
 Where CO2it represents the log of per capita carbon dioxide emissions of the ith nation in 
year t; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the logged value of nation i’s GDP per capita in time period t; 
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𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
2  is the log of the quadratic term for country i in year t; 𝐶𝑜𝑙 > 75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 is the 
binary measurement of being colonized for more than 75 years for nation i;  
𝐶𝑜𝑙1𝑇𝑜75𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 is the binary measurement of having been colonized between 1 and 75 
years for nation i; 𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖 is the binary measurement of the of never colonized nation 
i; 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the log of the percent of the population living in urban areas in nation i 
during year t. 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡
2  is the quadratic term for the log of urban population 
percentage; 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the value of the age dependency ratio for nation i in year t; 
𝑒0𝑖𝑡 is the residual difference in CO2 emissions per capita for the ith country in year t; 𝜇0𝑖 
is the residual differential CO2 emissions per capita value for country i when all predictor 
variables are held at 0; 𝜇1𝑖 is the residual difference in CO2 emissions per capita change 
for nation i for every additional 1 unit increase in GDP per capita; 𝜇2𝑖 is the residual 
difference in CO2 emissions per capita change for nation i for every additional 1 unit 
increase in GDP per capita squared; 𝜎𝑢0
2  represents the between nation variance in CO2 
emissions per capita (in models 3 and 4 this is only true at the intercept); 𝜎𝑢1
2  is the 
between nation variance in CO2 emissions per capita change for every 1 unit increase in 
GDP per capita; 𝜎𝑢2
2  is the between nation variance in CO2 emission per capita for every 
additional increase in GDP per capita squared; 𝜎𝑢0𝑢1
2  is the country level estimate of the 
covariance between nation’s value of CO2 emissions per capita at the intercept and their 
relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita; and 𝜎𝑢0𝑢2
2  is the 
country level estimate of the covariance between nation’s value of CO2 emissions per 
capita at the intercept and their relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and GDP 




 Results from the Null Model and Models 1-3 are presented below in Table 4. 
Investigation of the variance partition coefficients reported in the Null Model roughly 
indicates the proportion of variance that is explainable across units (e.g. at the country 
level), or within units (e.g. at the year level), when no variables of theoretical interest are 
considered. Results from the Null Model suggest that 89% of the variation in CO2 





2 ). Model 1 
incorporates within-unit factors that are commonly included in SHE analyses, in doing so 
it allows for an opportunity to explore the partition of variance when factors that are 
broadly understood to be important drivers of CO2 emissions per capita are included. 
Model 1 indicates that there is a non-monotonic relationship between GDP per capita and 
CO2 emissions per capita, where, as suggested by the EKC hypothesis the effect of GDP 
per capita is attenuated at higher levels of GDP per capita. Model 1 also indicates that 
urbanization is a positive of emissions. Variance partition analysis of Model 1 indicates 
that when level 1 variables of interest are included, 80% of variation on emissions per 
capita is explainable at the across-unit level (level 2).  
 Model 2 includes all variables of interest, including indicator variables for the 
time a nation spent under colonial rule. As with Model 1, Model 2 results are suggestive 
of a pattern in the relationship between economic activity and emissions that approaches 
an EKC, and points to the importance of urbanization as a driver of CO2 emissions per 
capita. As is the case with the Null model and Model 1, Model 2 indicates that the 
majority of the variation in CO2 emissions per capita is explainable at the country level 
(78%). Comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 allows for an exploration of the amount of 
variation that appears to be explainable by the inclusion of the colonial history variables. 
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Such an analysis demonstrates that roughly 12% of the level 2 variation in Model 1 is 
accounted for by the inclusion of variables for the time a nation spent under the rule of a 









= 0.119).  
 Model 4 uses cross-level interaction terms in order to allow for an examination of 
the moderating effect that the time a nation spent under the rule of a colonial power has 
on the relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita. Results from 
Model 4 are displayed graphically in Figure 2. According to Model 4 findings, nations 
that have never been colonized do display a relationship between emissions and growth 
that attenuates at higher levels of economic development. However, this relationship does 
not hold for any nation that has been colonized. According to Model 4, nations colonized 
between 1 and 75 years have the most environmentally intensive relationship between 
GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita. As can be seen in Figure 2, nations 
colonized between 1 and 75 years display a relationship between emissions and growth 
that is geometric, becoming increasingly positive as GDP per capita increases. Nations 
colonized for more than 75 years display a continuously positive relationship between 
GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita. It is important to note that the difference 
between nations that have been colonized for more than 75 years, and nations that were 
colonized between 1 and 75 years is, substantively, rather small. 
Taken together, these findings provide clear support for the hypothesis that the 
majority of the variation in CO2 emissions per capita is explainable by across unit, 
historical factors. The findings provide limited support for the hypothesis that the longer 
a nation is colonized the greater it’s relationship between emissions and economic 
development will be. While it is clear the being having been colonized is associated with 
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an increase in this relationship, nations colonized between 1 and 75 years display a more 
environmentally intensive relationship than those colonized for more than 75 years. This 
could suggest that other factors related to colonial legacies, such as the extractive logic of 
the colonizing nation, or the level of violence experienced within the colonies, 
themselves act as important predictors of this relationship (Ziltener, Kunzler, and Walter 
2017). Perhaps the greatest insight that can be gained from the results presented in Table 
4 and Figure 2 is that having been colonized appears to be associated with having a 
continuously positive relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita, 
while having never been colonized tends to be associated with a relationship between 
growth and emissions that attenuates as GDP per capita increases. Further, the colonial 
history variables account for 9.2% of all variation in CO2 emissions per capita, 
suggesting that colonial histories are an important aspect of contemporary CO2 emissions, 




*** p<.001   ** p<.01       * p<.001 
  
Table 3.4. Random Coefficients Models of Drivers of CO2 Emissions 
(All Variables are Logged) 
 
Variable Null Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Time (Level 1) Variables  
































Country (Level 2) Variables  








Never Colonized (Reference) – – – – 
Cross-Level Interaction Variables  
Never Colonized x GDPPC 
(Reference) 
_ _ _ _ 
Never Colonized x GDPPC2 
(Reference) 
_ _ _ _ 
















Constant 0.370 -11.564 -11.179 -11.537 
Variance Terms  
𝜎𝑒𝑜
2  (Year level) 0.343 0.114 0.114 0.238 
𝜎𝑢𝑜
2  (Country level) 2.794 0.453 0.399 49.379 
𝜎𝑢1
2  – – – 3.135 
𝜎𝑢2
2  – – – 0.012 
𝜎𝑢𝑜𝑢1
2  – – – -12.275 
𝜎𝑢𝑜𝑢2
2  – – – 0.724 
Nations 202 183 183 183 




























Drawing from Marxian theory, unequal ecological exchange, and environmental 
world systems theory, the analysis presented above demonstrates the importance of 
colonial legacies to socio-environmental outcomes. The findings here support previous 
work (Roberts and Grimes 1997; Roberts, Grimes and Manale 2003; Greiner and McGee 
2018) which has focused on understanding the relationship between international 
inequality and socio-environmental outcomes by arguing that there are developmental 
path dependencies in the relationship between environmental impact and economic 
development that are indelibly linked to the place that a nation has held within the 
international hierarchy of the global capitalist economy. By drawing attention to the 
underlying importance of colonization to understandings of contemporary inequality in 
the fields of unequal exchange, world systems theory, and their environmental 
counterparts, I have attempted to highlight the usefulness of considering colonial histories 
directly when attempting to understand links between international inequality and socio-
environmental relations.  
Empirically, the results presented above demonstrate the usefulness of using 
colonial history to operationalizing international inequality in several ways. First, the 
time a nation spent under colonial rule explains a sizable proportion of the variance in 
CO2 emissions per capita. While GDP per capita, urbanization, and the percent of the 
population that is of working age combined account for roughly 23% of the variation in 
emissions, inclusion of categorical variables for the length of time a nation was colonized 
accounts for 9% of such variation. This suggests that the time a nation spent under 
colonial rule is at least as important to understanding what social factors drive 
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anthropogenic emissions as variables that are widely accepted as being integral to such 
outcomes (IPCC 2014). Second, while there have been a number of operationalizations of 
inequality in the international economy, chapter 2 demonstrated that two of the most 
popular world systems measures of inequality, those of Clark and Beckfield (2009) and 
Snyder and Kick (1979), explain roughly 3%, and 5% of variation in emissions per 
capita, respectively. Relative to such findings, the length of time a nation was colonized 
for seems to more effectively capture differences in environmental impact, at least when 
impact is operationalized as CO2 emissions per capita. It should, however, be noted that 
since the models presented here and those presented in chapter 2 (Greiner and McGee 
2018) do not include the same nation-years they cannot be formally compared. Finally, 
use of the colonization variables has allowed for a much broader set of nations and years 
to be incorporated into this analysis than were able to be included in chapter 2 (Greiner 
and McGee 2018), or in similar analyses of the past (Roberts and Grimes 1997; Roberts, 
Grimes and Manale 2003). 
Theoretically, these results are supportive of the notion that colonial legacies 
established ongoing relationships of production, extraction, and exchange that 
disadvantaged nations of the global South (Bunker 1984; Barbosa 1993), making it 
difficult for them to grow their economies while simultaneously protecting their 
environment, yet facilitating such a phenomenon for nations of the global North. Further 
in demonstrating the importance of colonial legacies to environmental outcomes, the 
findings presented here support the claim that colonization and imperial relations were 
not just projects to control economic resources and international labor (Frank 1967, 
Emmauel 1972, Amin 1974), but were also the foundations for an ongoing ecological 
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imperialism (Foster, Clark and York 2010). Specifically, the findings presented above 
support the claim that the legacy of colonization allowed more powerful nations to 
maintain control over the exchange and production of economic goods in ways which are 
“central to the forces of competition and accumulation of capital and… [that generate] 
social and environmental inequalities within and between nations” (Foster, Clark and 
York 2010, p.346).  
Thus, centuries ago the global project of colonization “drew the conquerors down 
upon the conquered, because the conquered had the fertile lands, the needed materials, 
the arts of processing goods for human needs” (Du Bois 1995, p. 677). In many ways this 
project has been ongoing even as it has been continuously metamorphosed (Screpanti 
2014). For while the project of colonization gave imperial powers initial control over 
international systems of monetary and financial exchange, technologies, natural 
resources, and labor, it was the very ability to control these factors of international 
exchange and production that enabled such nations to maintain relations of unequal 
exchange and exploitation in the contemporary era (Amin 2013; Foster Clark and York 
2010). 
As mentioned above, work concerning racial capital has argued that colonization 
was a project which was both necessary to the expansion of capital and racialized in 
nature (Du Bois 1920; Robinson 2000). Thus, colonization not only established an 
international hierarchy of nation-states but relied upon racial logics to do so. If such an 
proposition is taken seriously, as I argue it should be, it suggests that the establishment 
and continuation of unequal ecological exchange has served to benefit both the 
environment and the economies of historically white nations at the expense of the 
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environment and economies in nations that people of color trace their ancestry to. 
Differences in cultural understandings of race make it problematic to explore the extent 
to which international legacies of colonization present an instance of environmental 
racism in an empirical sense. However, given the links between racial capitalism, 
colonization, and socio-environmental outcomes I encourage future research in this area 
to grapple with the notion of international environmental racism theoretically and 
historically. 
Finally, I wish to note that, while this study has demonstrated the importance of 
considering whether or not a nation was colonized when attempting to understand the 
relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita, it has also raised an 
important question. Namely, the lack of support for the hypothesis that nations colonized 
for a longer period of time would have a more strongly positive association with 
emissions indicates that other aspects of colonization might better explain the relationship 
between growth of GDP per capita and emissions per capita. Future research should aim 
to explore this possibility, interrogating how factors such as the colonizing nation and the 
extractive logic it employed impact the subsequent socio-environmental relations in the 





A Dissertation in Review 
 
 At the start of this inquiry I highlighted a number of questions that are raised 
when one considers the complex relationship between economic development, 
international inequality, and environmental impact. It is my hope that through the course 
of the analyses presented above the answers have become clearer.  In particular, through 
the examination of the relationship between the development of ecological rationality and 
environmental impact, as well as the inequality-environmental impact-international 
inequality complex, I have argued that the sustainable development concept, as it was put 
forth by the Brundtland Commission (UN 1987) and is expressed by supranational 
institutions today (World Bank 2012; UNEP 2017), contains a number of tensions that 
make it unlikely to be a successful model for the mitigation of anthropogenic climate 
change and the reduction of global inequality.  
In order to elaborate on these tensions, in the introductory chapter I draw from a 
number of neo-Marxian theories of environmental impact and international inequality. 
Drawing from the dependency theory tradition I outline the difficulties inherent in 
achieving an inclusive sustainability, while simultaneously achieving an economically 
profitable sustainability. In doing so I highlight the fundamental importance of 
establishing a downward pressure on wages through trade liberalization and the 
implementation of structural adjustment policies to the continuation of profit 
accumulation, as well as how such pressures result in international inequality by way of 
unequal exchange (Emmanuel 1972a) and the stratification of income at the national level 
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(Kristal 2010; Picketty 2014). I then explore the compatibility of the goal of mitigating 
environmental impact with that of maintaining or expanding the rate of economic 
development through the lens of environmental sociology theories– such as the treadmill 
of production (Schnaiberg 1980), environmental world systems (Roberts and Grimes 
1997), unequal ecological exchange (Bunker 1984), and impact literatures (York et al 
2003a). Through this lens I draw attention to the inescapable necessity of environmental 
additions and withdrawals in systems of production, as well the tendency for the 
environmental and social costs of such processes to be disproportionately shouldered by 
populations within the global South. From this theoretical viewpoint, it becomes clear, I 
argue, that a sustainable development framework which prioritizes the continued 
accumulation of capital cannot also successfully conserve environmental resources or 
protect environmental sinks.  
Ultimately, I note that despite the hopes that these tensions might be resolved 
through technology, when employed as a tool of accumulation technology is not able to 
successfully mitigate environmental change or reduce inequality. This is, in a broad 
sense, because technologies are used in order to expand the profit generating capabilities 
of the production process (Baran and Sweezy 1966), not to preserve environmental 
resources. As a result, increases in efficiency are often used in order to increase 
consumption to such a degree that the potential environmental benefit of the new 
technology is wiped out, as in the case of Jevons paradox (York and McGee 2015), or 
they are used in order to expand market penetration by using the new technologies in 
conjunction with–rather than in place of– older ones (York 2006; 2012). It is this same 
embeddedness in the logic of accumulation that prevents improvements in technological 
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efficiency from reducing inequality, as these improvements are seen as opportunities to 
minimize the costs of labor, resulting in global wage stagnation (Foster, McChesney, and 
Jonna 2011). 
In the end, I argue that it is misguided to believe that accumulation can be 
reconciled with environmental sustainability and the alleviation of global inequality, for 
the expropriation of resources on an ongoing and international scale by a minority of the 
world’s population, and hence the generation of inequality, is necessary to both the 
establishment of capital and the expansion of its reach (Marx 1976; Rosa 2004; 
Pomerantz 2000). Further, I consider the work of DuBois (1920; 2007) and others in the 
racial capital tradition (Robinson 2000) in recognizing that, in order to fulfill the 
requirement of expropriation and inequality, capitalism has racialized various populations 
and in doing so contributed to the creation a social hierarchy that operated on a national 
and international level. Internationally, this racialized hierarchy has justified the 
expropriation of natural resources, but also of human labor in the form of enslavement, 
colonization, and unequal exchange (Dawson 2016; Fraser 2016). Understanding this, it 
becomes clear that accumulation is incompatible with the elimination of inequality 
within, but especially between, nations. What’s more, such an understanding of the 
function of capital clarifies the need to consider the international hierarchy of the world 
system when attempting to elucidate the ability of economic growth to lead to the 
mitigation of climate change on a global scale, as well as the fact that– to a large degree– 
the roots of the contemporary international hierarchy of nations find their origin in 
colonization and imperialism. Thus, the colonial history of a nation offers a useful way to 
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understand international inequality. It is with an eye towards these issues that I perform 
the analyses in chapters 3 and 4. 
 In chapter 2 I use data from the World Bank (2013) and studies previously 
performed by Snyder and Kick (1979), Clark and Beckfield (2009), and Clark (2012) to 
perform a growth curve analysis examining the effect that the temporal aspects of 
ecological rationality have on levels of CO2 emissions per capita, while also accounting 
for geopolitical power. Put differently, I ask the question, are nations becoming more 
ecologically benign over time or less so, and is the relationship between time and 
pollution becoming more similar or diverging across nations as time progresses? In 
asking such questions I critically assess the validity of the claims of the ecological 
modernization school that difficult to measure social changes– such as the march of 
technology, the development of ecological concern among the population, and the 
establishment of environmental protection policies– will lead to an alleviation of the 
impact that social and economic processes have on the environment, even as economic 
growth continues unabated (Mol 1997; Mol 2002). I argue that, based on much of the 
logic laid forth in chapter 1, we should expect the less privileged nation-states that belong 
to the periphery and semi-periphery to both, 1) have less access to newer technologies 
(Amin 2013; Fröbel, Heinrichs, & Kreye 1981; Roberts & Grimes 1997; Roberts et al. 
2003; Schoenberger 1988), and 2) be required to use such technologies in ways that are 
environmentally harmful in order to grow their economy, leading such nations to become 
less environmentally friendly over time.  
The findings of chapter 2 suggest that, despite the belief that ecological rationality 
will– given time– lead to a reduction of the impact that socio-economic processes have 
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on the environment, most nations in the world system do not see such a reduction in 
impact. Surprisingly, those that do see such reductions typically belong to the global 
periphery, challenging the notion that the least powerful nations will also be the least able 
to mobilize the temporal factors of ecological rationality in order to mitigate their 
impacts. Equally surprising, I find that it is the most powerful nations that see the greatest 
increase in environmental impact over time. In order to understand these results, I turn to 
the ecological paradoxes presented in chapter 1, arguing that, in the wealthier nations of 
the core, technological advancement and growth in ecological rationality are 
accompanied by expansions of consumption and production, leading to an overall 
increase in the impact of these nations. Contrariwise, in the poorer nations of the global 
South the introduction of new technologies by global capital increases the efficiency of 
the production of products within the internal marketplace, and growth in ecological 
concern reduces consumption and waste overall. Ultimately, I argue that these results 
demonstrate that ecological rationality cannot, on its own, lead to the mitigation of global 
climate change, and– absent any other meaningful change– will likely continue to 
increase the pace of environmental harm induced through social and economic processes. 
Finally, these results point to a clear divergence in the way that nations relate to the 
environment as time passes, suggesting that the global movement towards 
environmentally weightless societies is not occurring. Ultimately, these results reveal that 
a nation’s position in the international economic hierarchy that constitutes the modern 
world system plays a large role in how it relates to the environment, suggesting that other 
aspects of socio-ecological relations should be explored in this context, a problem to 
which I turn in chapter 3. 
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In chapter 3, I turn my analysis towards the ability of a nation to employ gains in 
economic development in order to ‘purchase’ a more environmentally sustainable 
economy. Drawing from the environmental world systems theory, this exploration 
provides a critique of the EKC hypothesis as naïve with respect to issues of power in the 
international economy. Further, relying on the dependency tradition and unequal 
ecological exchange, I argue that, though a great deal of attention has been paid to 
temporally flexible drivers of climate change– such as the size of a nation’s economy, or 
the location of its population– much of a nation’s relationship between economic activity 
and impact can be explained by historical factors that vary across the globe. Of these 
historical factors, I argue that a nation’s position in the world system in the past is of key 
importance in understanding its socio-ecological relations in the future. Using the data 
from chapter 2 I find that a nation’s position in the world system at the time of the 
establishment of contemporary supranational institutions does significantly affect the 
relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and economic development that a nation 
displays. Contrary to the logic put forth by the EKC hypothesis, the findings displayed 
here suggest that it is only the most powerful nations in the global economy that are able 
to reduce their environmental impact as their economies grow. Conversely, nations 
belonging to the semi-periphery see an increase in environmental impact as the size of 
their economies increase. 
 When these findings are considered in conjunction with the theory of unequal 
ecological exchange, it seems likely that, rather than using economic growth in order to 
invest in greater environmental efficiency, the global core uses economic gains and 
political power in order to export the environmental harm associated with the processes 
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of accumulation to the semi-periphery. In this case, the EKC hypothesis is not just 
incorrect with respect to its assertion that economic growth provides the ability of a 
nation to invest in environmental goods regardless of that nation’s power in the 
international economic system. The proposition of the EKC that any nation is able to 
mobilize economic expansion in order to ‘purchase’ environmental protection is incorrect 
as well. What is observed in empirical analyses that find and EKC pattern is not 
investment in the protection of environmental goods. Rather, what is being observed is 
investment in the expropriation and exploitation of the environmental goods of other less 
powerful nations. Beyond demonstrating the theoretical underdevelopment of the EKC, in 
chapter 3 I find that the vast majority of variation in CO2 emissions per capita is 
attributable to factors such as the history of a nation-state, and not per se, in the size of its 
economy or the location and organization of its population. To be sure, factors such as 
economic growth impact emissions to a great degree, but the way in which they do so is 
predicated upon the historical development of a nation’s economy, and in particular the 
role that its economy plays within the international division of labor, as Frank (1967), 
Emmanuel (1972a), and Bunker (1984) argued decades ago. I argue that this has 
important implications with respect to the sustainable development concept and the 
design and implementation of the policy based upon it, as it suggests that– to a notable 
degree– the focus of sustainable development policy on growing economies and changing 
population structures would be better aimed at correcting international legacies of 
inequality that have led to unequal ecological exchange and international exploitation in 
the contemporary era. 
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Interestingly, while the analysis presented in chapter 3 overwhelmingly confirms 
the notion that much of the current patterns in socio-ecological outcomes can be 
attributed to variation in the historical development of a nation state, it also indicates that 
a relatively small amount of these relations are accounted for by a nation’s position in the 
world system following the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. This, to my 
mind, suggests that there could be other operationalizations of the historical legacy of 
inequality in the international economy that are more readily able to account for 
contemporary socio-ecological relations. Turning to Du Bois’ (1920) discussions of the 
importance of colonization and imperialism to the establishment and maintenance of the 
capitalist world system, as well as the coupled insights of the racialized foundations of 
these global institutions and the necessity of ongoing expropriation by way of 
racialization that were developed in the racial capital tradition (Du Bois 2007; Robinson 
2000; Pulido 2017), in chapter 4 I employ the length of time a nation was colonized for to 
measure inequality in the international system. 
The analysis performed in chapter 4 relies on new data in order to explore the 
relationship between the extent to which international inequality patterns the relationship 
between economic growth and environmental impact. In order to measure the amount of 
time a nation was exposed to the rule of a colonial power I drew from the Colonial 
Transformation Dataset (Ziltener, Kunzler and Walter 2017) and data on the occurrence 
of war in the contemporary world (Wimmer and Min 2006). I argued that in many 
instances, the international inequality that is referred to in the theoretical traditions of 
unequal exchange and world systems is the result of the legacy of colonial relations in the 
past. As a result, expressly measuring aspects of colonization might better capture the 
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effects of inequality in the current economy than attempting to develop an abstracted 
measure in order to capture the legacy of these relations indirectly, as operationalizations 
of world systems theory often do. Further, in chapter 4 I argue that, as work in the field of 
racial capital suggests, in order to properly understand contemporary patterns of inequity 
we must consider the establishment of a racialized global order in capital through the lens 
of historical materialism. Considering the inherent links between inequality, colonization, 
and racialization, measuring inequality via colonial legacies of the past offers an 
appropriate, albeit indirect, way to begin to incorporate considerations of racial capital 
into analyses of unequal ecological exchange. 
The findings presented in chapter 4 demonstrate two important developments in 
this line of reasoning. First, the indicator ‘time spent under colonial rule’ does a better job 
of explaining socio-ecological outcomes than the two, well-known, measures of world 
system position used in chapter 3. This suggests, in a broad sense, that the ways that the 
systems of international inequality established in the colonial era advantage and 
disadvantage nations are more numerous and complex than what is captured by 
accounting for the amount of control a nation is able to leverage over its own trade 
networks, or the number of international treaty agreements it is party to. This, put simply, 
is likely to be unsurprising to most, as the function of the international economy is far 
more complex than can be adequately accounted for through the use of a handful of 
variables. Contrary to what one might expect, however, the use of additional variables to 
measure inequality in the international economy is not necessarily likely to improve the 
accuracy with which inequality is captured. In large part, this is due to the additional 
complexity of determining the extent to which each additional variable included in 
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calculation of the world system, or global inequality, index contributes to the 
development of advantages and disadvantages in the international marketplace. For this 
reason I argue that parsimony is key, and while colonial legacies are also far from 
adequate when attempting to accurately portray the workings of international inequality, 
the origins of most aspects of inequality in these legacies makes it a rather good proxy for 
understanding where a nation stands. 
Second, the findings in chapter 4 demonstrate that, while differences in the length 
of time a nation was colonized did not change the relationship between GDP per capita 
and CO2 emissions per capita in a substantially meaningful way, whether or not a nation 
was colonized explains nearly 10% of the differences observed in emissions per capita 
between nations. This suggests that the historical fact of colonization is as important to 
understanding social drivers of climate change as any other factor that we have been able 
to observe save for, perhaps, advantages of geography. Further, in so far as colonization 
can be understood as a racialized project of international expropriation, this finding 
suggests that it is important to understand processes of unequal ecological exchange as an 
instance of environmental racism. Ultimately, I note that, while variation in cultural 
understandings of race make it difficult to examine this claim empirically, future work 
should consider these implications and strive to understand how it is that race, and other 
forms of inequality which contribute to the ongoing accumulation of capital 
internationally– such as gender inequality (Waring 1999; Norgaard & York 2005; Ergas 
and York 2012; Gaard 2015; Pellow 2014)– might be incorporated into discussions of 
international socio-ecological outcomes.  
Lesson Learned and Parting Thoughts 
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At the beginning of this dissertation I noted that the analyses within were a 
sociological meditation on questions raised in the course of considering the 
environmental impact-economic growth-international inequality nexus. In the course of 
this meditation I believe that I have developed several insights which could be of use to 
the field of environmental sociology, as well as to policy makers and activists who are 
truly interested in mitigating the potentially devastating effects of climate change by 
curbing the CO2 emissions of social and economic activity. First, in this dissertation I 
have highlighted the importance of understanding international inequality when exploring 
drivers of CO2 emissions and, more broadly, environmental impact. Those familiar with 
theoretical traditions in environmental sociology will not be surprised by this insight. 
However, I have, in a variety of ways, demonstrated this importance empirically as well 
as theoretically. Specifically, the analyses in chapters 2, 3, and 4 have shown that, outside 
the context of international power relations, attempting to understand the ties between 
economic growth and environmental impact can be highly misleading, if not wholly 
incorrect.  
Second, despite our wildest hopes to the contrary, we cannot expect incremental 
changes in social attitudes and technologies to resolve the problems of environmental 
depredation and international inequality. In the labor of creating a sustainable global 
society we can conceptualize the twin concerns of climate change and inequality as the 
heads of Orthus, each representing one dangerous face which exists in order to sustain the 
accumulation of capital, but in this analogy ecological rationality is no Hercules. Our 
hero must be bolder and dig deeper. Whatever form our Hercules ultimately takes, it must 
reckon with the fact that in order to eliminate the dangers presented by Orthus’ heads, it 
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must also allow Orthus’ body to perish. Thus, though there are no social laws which 
dictate what is possible and what is not, as we might find in the realms of physics or 
chemistry, it seems incredibly unlikely that we will create an equitable and 
environmentally sustainable social system without also radically transforming the social 
and economic relations that currently structure the function of our globalized society. 
Third, contemporary international inequality cannot be disentangled from the 
legacies of colonization and imperialism that the modern world system was constructed 
upon. The patterns of domination, expropriation, and exploitation that were established in 
the colonial era are inextricably linked to unequal exchange in the present day, as well as 
the environmental devastation that accompanies such trade imbalances. When we allow 
ourselves to consider these links, it becomes clear that the problem of the twentieth 
century– the color-line– (Du Bois 2003) is the problem of the twenty-first century as 
well, as it is impossible to fully understand the environmental crisis and the development 
of international inequality without it. Importantly, this suggests that the remediation of 
climate change and runaway inequality should begin with a consideration of the massive 
amounts of debt, pollution, and resource extraction that has been concentrated in the 
nations of the global South as a result of colonization, as well as potential ways to 
remedy these historical injustices. 
Finally, the sustainable development concept is, put bluntly, unattainable as it is 
currently conceived. The tensions within this important idea are simply too great to be 
resolved. So long as development is understood as economic growth, its incorporation in 
sustainable development policy approaches will prevent the achievement of 
environmental sustainability and international equity. Considering this, I argue that we 
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should not be concerned with sustainable development, so much as with the social 
development of sustainability. When we focus on the development of sustainability, as 
opposed to the achievement of sustainable development, it allows us to deprioritize 
accumulation, and in doing so to reconsider the relation of nation-states to one another 
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